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Contemporary learning theories posit the existence of at least two distinct systems 
that mediate learning. These systems are recognized under the dual-learning systems 
(DLS) hypothesis as a reflective system that is available to conscious awareness and that 
uses working memory resources to develop and test hypotheses, and a reflexive system 
that is not available to conscious awareness and that depends on learning via 
reinforcement. Depression is associated with impairments in reflexive processes, 
including blunted implicit reward sensitivity and biased attention to negative information, 
and impairments in reflective processing, including declines in working memory, 
planning, and problem solving. We hypothesize that these deficits contribute to observed 
differences in decision-making performance associated with depression. In this series of 
work we explore the effects of sub-clinical symptoms of depression on decision-making 
performance and use the dual-learning systems hypothesis to develop targeted training 
mechanisms to modify behavior in two types of decision-making tasks.  
In order to effectively develop mechanisms to modify performance, we must 
understand the cognitive processes and strategies that are necessary for optimal task 
performance. In Chapters 1 and 2 we identify two types of decision-making tasks for 
which reflective and reflexive strategies differentially affect performance. The reflective 
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task is a history-dependent decision-making task for which short-term rewards must be 
foregone to maximize long-term performance. The reflexive task is a history-independent 
decision-making task for which one option gives a higher average reward and rewards are 
only dependent on the most recent response. Chapters 3 and 4 confirm deficits associated 
with elevated symptoms of depression in both of these tasks and test the effects of 
attention and working-memory training paradigms on modifying behavior. These 
chapters focus on inducing short-term improvements in decision-making by modifying 
the strategies that participants engage.  
Whereas much of this work explores short-term training with a goal of 
temporarily improving processing in individuals with elevated symptoms of depression, 
Chapter 5 uses long-term working memory training with a goal of producing persisting 
changes in cognitive processing. Implications for future work are discussed.  
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OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
From financial choices to lifestyle and health decisions, weighing the value of 
different options and making choices is a necessary part of our day-to-day activity. 
Reward processing is critical to many of these decisions, and deficits in reward 
processing could be devastating to a person’s quality of life. Many individuals have 
difficulty with reward processing and decision-making, in particular those with major 
depressive disorder and elevated depressive symptoms (i.e. Beevers et al., 2013; Eshel & 
Roiser, 2010; Maddox, Gorlick, Worthy & Beevers, 2012; Pizzagalli et al., 2009).  
Much research suggests that there are at least two dissociable and 
neurobiologically-grounded learning systems: a reflective, hypothesis-testing system, and 
reflexive, procedurally-based system. These systems likely use reward information 
differently, and we need to understand similarities and differences in reward processing 
across these two systems. We can then use knowledge of the systems to develop 
interventions to reduce deficits that are associated with depression. 
DUAL-LEARNING SYSTEMS THEORY  
This series of studies examines different types of decision-making tasks under the 
dual-learning systems hypothesis, which posits that learning involves a competition 
between reflective and reflexive cognitive systems. An extensive body of behavioral and 
neuroimaging studies have explored these competing learning systems (Ashby & 
Maddox, 2005; Ashby & Maddox, 2011; Blanco, Otto, Maddox, Beevers, & Love, 2013; 
Chandrasekaran, Yi, & Maddox, 2014; Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Knowlton, 1999; 
Knox, Otto, Stone, & Love, 2012; Maddox & Ashby, 2004; Nomura et al., 2007; 
Poldrack & Packard, 2003). The reflective learning system uses working memory and 
executive attention to develop and test verbal rules (i.e. Maddox & Ashby, 2004). In 
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contrast, the reflexive learning system is not dependent on working memory and 
executive attention (DeCaro, Thomas & Beilock, 2008) and operates by forming 
automatic associations with actions that lead to reward (Seger, 2008; Seger & Cincotta, 
2005; Seger & Miller, 2010).  
It should be noted that the reflective/reflexive distinction in decision-making is 
similar to the model-based/model-free distinction (Daw et al., 2005; Doya et al., 2002; 
Glascher, Daw, Dayan, & O’Doherty, 2010). In model-based systems, decision-makers 
build cognitive maps or models of the environment that relate different ‘‘states’’ of the 
reward environment to each other. Decision-makers using model-free learning systems 
learn action values directly, by trial and error, without forming an explicit representation 
of the reward environment (Daw et al., 2005). While similar to the model-based/model-
free distinction, our distinction between reflective and reflexive processing is different in 
that reflective processing is defined by the use of working memory and executive 
processing to inform decisions, even if the strategy is only a simple heuristic-based 
process. While engaging reflective processes, individuals do not necessarily have to form 
an explicit model or representation of the underlying reward structure.  
Engagement of the reflective and reflexive learning systems often leads to 
different behavioral results and has also been associated with different neural regions that 
support their differentiation. Processing in the reflective system is available to conscious 
awareness and is mediated by structures in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior 
caudate nucleus, anterior cingulate, and medial temporal lobe, while learning in the 
reflexive, procedural-based learning system is mediated primarily by the posterior 
caudate nucleus and putamen (Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Ashby & O’Brien, 2005).  
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DUAL SYSTEM TASK MEDIATION 
We study decision-making using two very different types of tasks. In history-
independent situations the rewards available from the options in the environment are not 
affected by the history of previous choices—only the most recent selection. In these 
paradigms the rewards available for each option on each trial are set by the experimenter 
and vary based on the trial number. Many tasks used to study decision-making 
incorporate history-independent reward structures, including tasks like the Iowa 
Gambling task (e.g. Denburg, Tranel & Bechara, 2005), the Behavioral Investment 
Allocation Strategy task (e.g. Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Samanez-Larkin, Kuhnen, Yoo 
& Knutson, 2010), and the Monetary Incentive Delay task (e.g. Samanez-Larkin et al., 
2007).  
On the other hand, history-dependent tasks are tasks for which the rewards 
available from various options depend on the previous history of choices. This type of 
decision-making draws similarities to real world decision-making in that our decisions 
often affect what possibilities are available in the future. For example, one may choose to 
attend college or to seek employment. While this is only one decision, the choice affects 
the availability of future rewards at future decisions. If one chooses work over attending 
school then experienced-based positions (with associated rewards) become available. 
Alternately, if school is chosen then other rewards may be available. Similarly, one must 
often make the choice between spending money now and saving for later. Spending 
money now can provide an immediate reward, but saving for later can often result in a 
greater delayed reward. For these tasks in which immediate and long-term goals conflict, 
optimal performance is often not able to be achieved using simple reflexive strategies, but 
relies on reflective processing.  
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DEPRESSION 
Depression is a common and recurrent condition. The World Health Organization 
has reported that over 120 million people currently suffer from depression, and many 
more have elevated depressive symptoms. In addition to predicting future suicide 
attempts, interpersonal problems, and substance abuse (Kessler et al., 2003; Kessler & 
Walters, 1998), depression is also known to affect a wide range of cognitive processes, 
spanning both reflexive and reflective domains.  
Cognitive theories of depression (e.g., Beck, 1976; Teasdale, 1988) suggest that a 
contributing factor to depression is an attentional bias for depression-relevant themes. 
Depressed individuals focus attention on negative information (Mathews & MacLeod, 
2005). Several studies have documented a negative attentional bias in depression (Mogg 
& Bradley, 2005), as well as an absence of a positive attentional bias (Ellis, Beevers, & 
Wells, 2011; Gotlib & Krasnoperova, 1998; Sears, Thomas, LeHuquet, & Johnson, 
2010).  
Decision-making is a complex process, but one critical aspect of decision-making 
is reward-based learning (i.e., Ridderinkhof & van den Wildenberg, 2004), which 
depends on the acquisition of knowledge, implicit or explicit, about the relationships 
between stimuli and actions (Berridge & Robinson, 2003). Thus, individuals must learn 
from available rewards and use this information to make decisions. We propose that some 
observed decision-making deficits associated with depression are due to negative 
attentional biases, which could undermine learning from rewards. That is, that 
hypersensitivity to punishment (Eshel & Roiser, 2010) and biased attention toward 
negative stimuli may cause suboptimal responding in reflexive decision-making tasks.  
Depression is also associated with deficits in a range of reflective processes, such 
as problem solving (Elderkin-Thompson, Mintz, Haroon, Lavretsky, & Kumar, 2006), 
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planning (Rogers et al., 2004), cognitive flexibility (Butters et al., 2004), and memory 
(Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995). We further hypothesize that impairments in these 
processes underlie the deficit associated with depression in reflective decision-making 
tasks (Blanco, Otto, Maddox, Beevers, & Love, 2013; Maddox et al., 2012).  
THE PRESENT STUDIES  
In the next chapter (Chapter 1) we explore the dependence of different types of 
decision-making tasks on explicit processing to establish that functioning necessary for 
one type of decision-making is not as critical for optimal performance in different types 
of decision-making. Importantly, this work suggests that improvements to processes 
necessary for improving reflexive processing may not be effective in improving other 
types of decision-making, such as reflective decision-making.  
In Chapter 2 we explore the relationship between decision-making tasks and 
individual strategy predispositions. We do this to establish that we do not simply have 
“good decision makers” and “bad decision makers”—that individuals who perform well 
using one decision-making structure may not perform well in a different type of task. In 
Chapter 2 we also study the stability of strategy utilization over time to establish that, 
without intervention, individuals tend to rely on the same decision-making strategies 
regardless of their efficacy. As a whole, Chapters 1 and 2 seek to establish that the 
decision-making reward structures that we implement rely on different underlying 
processes, as outlined in the dual-systems hypothesis, and that improving decision-
making performance will likely rely on different interventions that modify strategy 
engagement.   
In the remaining chapters we explore targeted training techniques to improve both 
reflective and reflexive decision-making performance in individuals with elevated 
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symptoms of depression. We hypothesize that although the same group of individuals 
may show deficits in multiple types of tasks, these deficits are likely due to different 
causes and thus should be approached using different modification strategies. In Chapter 
3 we explore the effect of attention training to improve reflexive decision-making 
performance. We find that attention training is effective in improving reflexive decision-
making, but is ineffective at improving reflective decision-making. Due to the influence 
of working memory on the history-dependent decision-making task, we attempt to 
improve decision-making using a working-memory training paradigm in Chapter 4. We 
find that working memory training using an operational span procedure is successful in 
improving subsequent history-dependent and history-independent decision-making 
performance.  
The final chapter of this dissertation contains preliminary data from a long-term 
working memory training study. The goal of this endeavor is to produce longer-lasting 
changes in decision-making. The preliminary results of this study suggest that working 
memory training over a period of five weeks can change decision-making performance, 





Chapter 1: Dependence (and Independence) on Working Memory 
Resources  
Decisions are an important part of daily life. While some decisions are isolated 
events, other decisions are more complicated, requiring the decision-maker to take into 
consideration the effect that each decision will have on available rewards in the future. In 
the current study we compare the effects of working memory load on these two different 
types of decision-making, using one task for which the available rewards on each trial do 
not depend on previous choices (history-independent), and another task in which the 
rewards available at each point depend on the participant’s recent history of choices 
(history-dependent). Using the dual systems framework to form our hypotheses, we 
believe that working memory load will affect these two types of decision-making in 
different ways.   
Dual learning systems theory suggests that there are at least two learning systems 
through which learning may be moderated: a reflective system that is available to 
conscious awareness and that uses working memory resources to develop and test 
hypotheses; and a reflexive system that is not available to conscious awareness and 
depends on learning via reinforcement (e.g. Ashby & Alfonso-Reese, 1998). Use of the 
reflective learning system requires participants to develop and test hypotheses, often 
relying on the use of verbal rules. Alternately, reinforcement-learning moderated by the 
reflexive system does not require the use of explicit processes. This dual-systems 
hypothesis has been supported in the domain of category learning through a combination 
of behavioral experiments and computational modeling evaluating the effect of working 
memory load on performance (Miles & Minda, 2011; Waldron & Ashby, 2001; 
Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006). Specifically, a simultaneous working-memory task 
significantly reduces performance in category learning tasks that rely on explicit rule-
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based processing, but does not impair performance in category learning tasks relying on 
implicit procedural learning (Waldron & Ashby, 2001; Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006).    
We hypothesize that different types of decision-making tasks will be differentially 
affected by working memory load, similar to the results of the category-learning 
literature. Most decision-making tasks used in the laboratory, like the ones in the current 
study, can be classified as either history-independent or history-dependent. History-
independent tasks are those for which the available rewards at each trial are only 
dependent on the current choice. In these tasks, the rewards available for each option are 
often pre-determined by the experimenter or selected randomly from a known 
distribution. The history-independent task that we use in the current study requires 
participants to repeatedly select between two reward options and learn which option gives 
the higher average reward via trial-and-error. In this task, the rewards given for each trial 
only depend on the option selected and the trial number. Alternately, experiments may 
require participants to determine the relationship between available rewards and their 
previous choice history, referred to as history-dependent decision-making, or state-based 
decision-making (i.e. Worthy, Cooper, Byrne, Gorlick & Maddox, 2014). The history-
dependent task that we use in the current study also requires participants to repeatedly 
select between two reward options, but optimal performance depends on participants 
learning to forego the higher immediate reward to increase their long-term rewards. 
The history-dependent task has been explicitly linked to working memory 
availability (Worthy, Otto, & Maddox, 2012). Participants who completed the decision-
making task with a simultaneous working memory demanding dual-task selected the 
optimal choice less frequently than individuals in a single-task condition (Worthy et al., 
2012), a finding that we seek to replicate. We hypothesize that the history-independent 
task is not similarly dependent on working memory resources and that performance can 
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be successfully attained using automatic, reflexive processing (Cooper et al., 2014), but 
we have not directly evaluated this relationship using a similar dual-task experiment. In 
the present study we will examine the reliance of performance in these tasks on working 
memory using a dual-task procedure that has been used to examine the dependence of 
reflexive and reflective category learning on working memory (Zeithamova & Maddox, 
2006), and used to examine the relationship between working-memory and history-
dependent decision-making (Worthy et al., 2012). We expect that performance will be 
reduced in the dual task condition for the history-dependent task (replicating Worthy et 
al., 2012), but that performance will not be reduced in the history-independent task. The 
results of both tasks will be supplemented with computational modeling analyses that 
quantify the extent to which participants rely on heuristic-based strategies versus 
reinforcement learning strategies.  
METHOD 
Participants  
Participants were 99 young adults recruited from the University of Texas at 
Austin. Participants were given course credit for their participation.  
Decision-Making Tasks 
Each participant completed 250 trials of the Martian Oxygen task (Figure 1.1) 
under single or dual task conditions. At the beginning of each trial the participant chose 
between two reward options, represented on the keyboard by button ‘Z’ and button ‘?/’. 
For each choice a positive reward was presented, which was then added to their 
cumulative reward total. After the cumulative total updated the next trial would begin and 
the participant would again be asked to choose between the two reward options. The 
participant was given the goal to maximize reward over the course of the experiment. The 
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reward structure assigned to each task (unknown to the participant) determined the level 
of reward that the participant received for each selection on each trial.  
Figure 1.1: Sample Decision-Making Trial.  
At the beginning of each trial, participants choose between two options. Participants are  
then shown the reward for that trial. The reward is added to their cumulative total and 
another trial begins.   
The reward amounts given for each option were determined by the underlying 
reward structure: history-dependent or history-independent. In this history-dependent 
task, rewards available on each trial were dependent on the participants’ recent history of 
choices. One of the options, the increasing option, caused the rewards available for both 
options to increase. The other option, the decreasing option, caused the future rewards 
available for each option to decrease. The precise reward given on each trial was 
calculated based on the number of increasing option selections in the 10 most recent 
selections. The increasing option is represented by h in the following equations:  
The rewards given when the increasing option was selected: 
30+5h; 
While the rewards given when the decreasing option was selected: 
40+5h 
Thus, rewards received in this task were not independent and were determined by 
the participants’ choice history. Repeatedly selecting the increasing option for 10 
consecutive trials resulted in a reward of 80 points on each subsequent trial, while 
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repeatedly selecting the decreasing option resulted in a reward of 40 points on each trial. 
The optimal strategy in this task was to repeatedly select the increasing option, which 
gave a smaller reward on each trial relative to the decreasing option, but caused the 
rewards for both options to increase in the long-term.  
 
Figure 1.2: History-Dependent Reward Structure.  
Rewards given for each option as function of the number of times the increasing option 
was selected over the previous ten trials.  Selecting the increasing option ten consecutive 
times leads to a reward of 80 units of oxygen on each trial, whereas selecting the 
decreasing option ten consecutive times leads to a reward of 40 units of oxygen on each 
trial.  
The rewards available on each trial in the history-independent task were only 
dependent on the trial number. One option gave an average reward of 55 points while the 
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thus highly variable. The optimal strategy in this task was to exploit the option that gave 
highest average reward. 
Figure 1.3: History-Independent Reward Structure.  
Rewards are given for each option as a function of the trial number. Option A gives an 
average reward of 55, whereas option B gives an average reward of 65.   
In the present study participants completed the history-dependent or history-
independent decision-making task in either single or dual task conditions, a 2x2 design 
resulting in 4 conditions. In all conditions participants were given a goal of maximizing 
points. On each trial they repeatedly chose between two options, received a reward for 














Single vs Dual Task Conditions 
Trials in the dual-task condition were separated by a working-memory demanding 
numerical analog of the Stroop Task (See Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Stroop, 1935). Two 
numbers were displayed on either size of the screen that differed in numerical value and 
physical size. Participants were asked to remember which of two numbers was physically 
larger and which was larger in numerical value, and to hold that information in mind 
while deciding which reward option to select. At the beginning of the trial the two 
numbers for the concurrent task were presented on each side of the screen, one number 
on each side, for 200ms. After 200ms a uniform white mask covered the numbers for 
200ms and participants were then allowed to make a decision and given feedback 
regarding their choice. A new screen then appeared that prompted participants with either 
“VALUE” or “SIZE,” and participants indicated which side had the number largest in 
either numerical value or physical size. After they made their response they were told 
whether they were correct or not, and the next trial began. Participants in the single-task 
condition completed only the decision-making task with an inter-trial interval designed to 
match the timing of the dual-task condition. 
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Figure 1.4: Dual-Task Trial Details.  
Participants are shown two numbers on either side of the screen that vary in physical size 
and value. Participants have to hold this information in working memory during the 
decision-making trial and feedback, after which they are asked which side was bigger in 
either value or physical size.  
In category learning, this dual task significantly reduces performance in reflective 
tasks that rely on explicit rule-based processing, but does not impair performance in 
reflexive procedural tasks (Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006). We expect that performance 
will be reduced in the dual task condition for the history-dependent task (replicating 
Worthy et al., 2012), but will not be significantly reduced in the history-independent task.  
RESULTS 
Performance on these tasks is measured by the proportion of trials in which 
participants select the optimal choice (Figure 1.5).  Using a 2x2 ANOVA, we find an 
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interaction, F(1,95) = 3.527, p = .063, partial-η2 = .036. We also find a main effect of 
both reward structure, F(1,95) = 26.139, p < .001, partial-η2 = .216, and dual task 
condition, F(1,95) = 9.767, p = .002, partial-η2 = .093. Using pairwise comparisons to 
decompose the interaction, the effect of dual task in the history-dependent condition was 
highly significant: t(53) = 3.501, p = .001, Cohen’s d = .962; while the effect of dual task 
on history-independent decision-making was not significant, t(42) = .927, p = .359, 
Cohen’s d = .286. This indicates that history-dependent decision-making performance 
was negatively affected by the simultaneous dual task procedure, while history-
independent decision-making performance was not affected by the working-memory 
taxing dual task.  
 
Figure 1.5: Chapter 1 Performance.  
Performance is measured by proportion of optimal selections. On the left, performance is 
averaged across all 250 trials. On the right, performance is broken into five blocks of 50 
trials to show changes in learning across the course of the experiment. Error bars 




















































We also examined learning across the task by partitioning performance across the 
250-trial experiment into five blocks of 50 trials. We observed a significant block x 
reward structure x dual task interaction, F(4,92) = 2.917, p = .025, partial-η2 = .113. 
Within the history-independent task performance increased from the first block (M = .62) 
to the last block (M = .69), F(4, 168) = 2.195, p = .072, partial-η2 = .050. However, block 
did not interact with condition, (p = .910), indicating that performance changed at similar 
rates between the two conditions. The main effect of condition was also not significant (p 
= .359), indicating that the dual-task condition did not negatively impact performance in 
the history-independent decision-making task. In the history-dependent task, we found 
that performance improved from the first block (M = .38) to the last block (M = .51), F(4, 
212) = 7.314, p < . 001, partial-η2 = .121. Block also interacted with condition, F(4, 212) 
= 12.038, p < .001, partial-η2 = .185. Performance in the first block was similar between 
single-task (M = .37) and dual-task (M = .39) conditions, but performance in the single-
task condition improved by the last block (M = .65) while performance in the dual-task 
condition did not (M = .35). The main effect of condition was also significant, F(1, 53) = 
12.258, p < .001, partial-η2 = .188, indicating that participants performed better in the 
single-task condition (M = .55) than in the dual-task condition (M = .34).  
Modeling  
One advantage of our approach is that the decision-making tasks are amenable to 
computational modeling that can provide additional insight into the decision-making 
behavior of our participants.  The proportion of optimal sections (reported above) is 
useful in assessing performance, but does not provide insight into the strategies that 
participants implement. Modeling is especially useful when similar performance can be 
attained through different approaches. We applied a series of computational models to the 
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individual participants’ data on a trial-by-trial basis.  The models included a heuristic-
based win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) model and a Reinforcement Learning (RL) model.  
WSLS models have been used to model behavior in decision-making tasks (Otto, 
Taylor & Markman, 2011; Steyvers, Lee, & Wagenmakers, 2009; Worthy et al., 2012; 
Worthy & Maddox, 2011). The WSLS model assumes that participants compare the 
reward received on the present trial to the reward that they received on the previous trial 
and has a total of two free parameters P(stay|win) and P(shift|loss). If the reward is 
greater than or equal to the reward on the previous trial it is a “win” trial and participants 
“stay” by picking the same option on the next trial with an estimated probability.  
P (ai , t |choicet−1 = ai&r(t − 1) ≥ r(t − 2)) = P(stay|win)     (1.1) 
The probability of switching to the other option after a “win” is 1- P(stay|win). If 
the reward is less than the reward received on the previous trial it is a “loss” trial, and 
participants “shift” by picking the other option on the next trial, with an estimated 
probability.   
P (aj , t |choicet−1 = ai&r(t − 1) < r(t − 2)) = P(shift|loss)    (1.2) 
The probability of staying with an option after a “loss” is 1-P(shift|loss). 
Utilization of a WSLS strategy can lead to good performance in the history-dependent 
task since performance relies on one’s ability to observe how rewards improve or decline 
across trials (Worthy et al., 2012).   
The Softmax RL model accounts for decision-making behavior by updating 
expected reward values (EVs) for each option, i, on each trial, t, in Equation 1.4.  
Expected values (EVs) are initialized at zero for each option and are updated based on 
prediction error δ:  
δ = " # − %&',)        (1.3) 
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 Here r(t) is the reward received for the chosen option. Prediction errors are used 
to update expected values each time an option is chosen based on the update rule: 
%&',)*+ = 	%&',) + 	/ ∙ 1       (1.4) 
The recency parameter (α) weighs the degree to which participants use their most 
recently received reward to update expected values. As α approaches 1, recent rewards 
are given greater weight, while an α of zero indicates that no learning took place. The 
expected values for each option are used to determine the probabilities for selecting each 
option by the Softmax decision rule (Sutton & Barto, 1998): 
2 3', # = 	
4[6∙78 9:,; ]
4[6∙78 9=,; ]>=?@
   (1.5) 
Where θ is an inverse temperature parameter representing the degree to which the option 
with the highest EV is chosen.  Higher values of θ indicate that the highest valued option 
is chosen more often.  
We fit the computational models described above to each participant’s data on a 
trial-by-trial basis to obtain the fit of each model minimizing negative log-likelihood. To 
analyze an individual participant’s reliance on one model over the other, and consistent 
with Worthy et al. (2012), we subtracted the fit of the WSLS model from the fit of the RL 
model. Because lower fit values indicate better model fit, positive values of the WSLS 
difference metric can be interpreted as the WSLS model being the better fitting model, 
while negative values indicate that the RL model is the better fitting model.  
We conducted a 2 (reward structure) x 2 (dual task) ANOVA on the WSLS 
difference metric for each group. We observed a main effect of dual task condition 
F(1,95) = 19.276, p < .001, partial-η2 = .169. Main effects of reward structure and reward 
structure by dual task interaction were both non-significant, p > .2. In both the history-
independent and history-dependent conditions participants were best fit by the WSLS 
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model when working memory was not taxed (M = 9.62, M = 13.15). Both groups were 
better fit by the reinforcement-learning model when working memory was taxed with a 
concurrent dual task (M = -10.70, M = -4.31). 
 
Figure 1.6: Chapter 1 Modeling Results.  
This graph shows the difference between the fit of the WSLS and the RL model, 
calculated for each participant and averaged within the group. Higher values indicate 
better relative fit of the WSLS model. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
DISCUSSION 
These results indicate that participants rely on more heuristic-based strategies 
when working memory is not taxed. However, when working memory is taxed by a 
concurrent dual task, participants shift to more implicit strategies that are captured by the 
reinforcement-learning model.  
For the task that relies heavily on reflective processing for good performance, the 

















However, in the history-independent task performance does not decline with a shift to 
reflexive reinforcement-learning strategies. This is because good performance on the 
history-independent task can be achieved using reflexive strategies. Importantly, these 
results show that performance on the history-dependent task is dependent on the 
availability of working memory resources, while performance on the history-independent 
task is not dependent on working memory.  
The findings of this study indicate that two types of decision-making tasks used in 
these studies, (history-dependent and history-independent) rely on different underlying 
mechanisms for optimal performance. Performance in the history-dependent task relies 
on the use of working memory resources, while performance in the history-independent 
task is not dependent on working memory. Training methods that improve reflexive 
processing or encourage the use of reflexive strategies, even if effective at improving 




Chapter 2: Stability of Decision-Making Performance and Strategy 
Engagement  
In Chapter 1 we established that performance in reflective (history-dependent) 
decision-making is dependent on working memory, while performance in reflexive 
(history-independent) decision-making is not dependent on working memory—that good 
performance in the history-independent task can be attained even under working memory 
load and with the use of implicit reinforcement-learning strategies. In the current chapter 
we explore individual biases toward these reflective and reflexive strategies. If decision-
making performance and strategy engagement are stable, then interventions that seek to 
change decision-making performance should seek to change the strategies that are being 
implemented. Combined with Chapter 1, the current chapter will be useful in designing 
interventions to modify decision-making in the following chapters.  
Optimal performance in most decision-making tasks relies on the use of either 
reflective or reflexive decision-making strategies. To date, reflective vs. reflexive system-
level competition has not been fully explored in decision-making. Both history-dependent 
and history-independent tasks have been widely used to study decision-making 
performance in a number of different populations, including older and younger adults 
(Worthy et al., 2011) and individuals with symptoms of depression (Beevers et al., 2013, 
Maddox et al., 2012). Additional work in our labs has looked at the effect of personality 
traits and situational factors on performance in these tasks (e.g. Cooper et al., 2014). A 
number of our studies have used computational modeling to compare strategy 
implementation between groups or conditions. One gap in our rigorous line of research is 
a within-subjects comparison of these types of decision-making reward structures. In the 
current study we evaluate predispositions to decision-making strategies by fitting 
computational models to within-subjects history-dependent and history-independent 
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decision-making data. This line of research will address several key questions. In 
Experiment 1 we test whether individual performance in one reward structure is 
indicative of performance in other reward structures, and whether individuals rely on the 
same or different strategies in each type of experiment. In Experiment 2 we investigate 
whether or not the engagement of strategies is consistent over time.  
EXPERIMENT 1: WITHIN-SUBJECT DECISION-MAKING PERFORMANCE 
In Experiment 1 we collect within-subject decision-making data using the history-
independent and history-dependent decision-making tasks to evaluate the relationship 
between these tasks. One possibility is that individuals who perform well in one type of 
task will perform well in other types of tasks—leading to positive correlations in 
performance but negative correlations in model fit.  
An alternate possibility is that individuals who excel in reflective decision-making 
tasks will perform poorly in the reflexive decision-making task. We predict that 
performance between tasks will be correlated due to the reliance on the same strategies. 
We make these predictions because, through the use of reflective strategies, optimal 
performance in the history-dependent task requires participants to forego the higher 
immediate reward on each trial in order to maximize long-term rewards. For the history-
independent task optimal performance is achieved by selecting the higher immediate 
reward. Thus, individuals who have a stronger preference for the immediately rewarding 
option, supported by the use of reflexive strategies, should do better in the history-
independent tasks while individuals who show a greater preference for long-term rewards 
and reflective strategies should do better in the history-dependent task.  
Computational modeling provides insight into the specific learning operations 
(e.g. reflective vs. reflexive) that participants employ (Cleeremans & Dienes, 2008) and 
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can be used to gain additional information about individual variability in task 
performance. In short, information about overall task performance, or proportion of 
optimal selections, provides information about the level of performance but does not 
necessarily tell us much about the specific strategy being used by a participant because 
some reflexive and reflective strategies can yield similar rates of performance. In order to 
gain additional information about participants’ reliance on reflective and reflexive 
strategies we will utilize computational modeling. We expect that individual participants 
will tend to rely on the same strategies, even when the strategies are not optimal for the 
particular type of task. We also expect that these strategy biases will (at least partially) 
account for observed differences in performance between different types of tasks.   
EXPERIMENT 1 METHOD 
Participants  
Participants were young adults (Mage = 19.07; SDage = 1.31) recruited from the 
University of Texas at Austin. Each participant (N = 38) completed decision-making 
tasks with both history-independent and history-dependent reward structures1. The order 
in which they received the different reward structures was counterbalanced across 
participants. For each participant, each task (reward structure) was paired with one of 
three surface features. Participants were compensated $10 per hour for their participation. 
For each task participants completed 250 trials. At the beginning of each trial the 
participant chose between two reward options, represented on the keyboard by button ‘Z’ 
and button ‘?/’. For each choice a positive reward was presented, which was then added 
                                                





to their cumulative reward total. After the cumulative total updated the next trial would 
begin and the participant would again be asked to choose between the two reward 
options. Regardless of surface feature, in each task participants were always given a goal 
to maximize their amount of cumulative reward across the course of the experiment.  
Reward Structures 
The reward amounts given for each option were determined by the underlying 
reward structure: history-dependent and history-independent. In the history-dependent 
task, rewards available on each trial are dependent on the participants’ recent history of 
choices. One of the options, the increasing option, causes the rewards available for both 
options to increase. The other option, the decreasing option, causes the future rewards 
available for each option to decrease. The precise reward given on each trial is calculated 
based on the number of increasing option selections in the 10 most recent selections. The 
increasing option is represented by h in the following equations:  
The rewards given when the increasing option was selected: 
15+5h; 
While the rewards given when the decreasing option was selected: 
55+5h 
Thus, rewards received in this task were not independent and were determined by 
the participants’ choice history. Repeatedly selecting the increasing option for 10 
consecutive trials resulted in a reward of 65 points on each subsequent trial, while 
repeatedly selecting the decreasing option resulted in a reward of 55 points on each trial. 
The optimal strategy in this task was to repeatedly select the increasing option, which 
gave a smaller reward on each trial relative to the decreasing option, but caused the 
rewards for both options to increase in the long-term.  
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Unlike the history-dependent task, the rewards available on each trial in the 
history-independent task are not based on the participants’ recent pattern of choices, but 
only on the most recent selection. One option gave an average reward of 55 points, while 
the other option gave an average reward of 65 points. The standard deviation of each 
option was 10 points. Thus, while an option may give a higher average value, it will not 
give a higher value on every trial.  
RESULTS 
The proportion of trials on which participants selected the optimal choice was 
used to assess performance in each task. For the history-independent task, the optimal 
choice was the option that awarded an average of 65 points, while the sub-optimal choice 
was the option that gave an average reward of 55 points. In the history-dependent 
condition the optimal choice was the increasing option, the option that gave the lower 
reward on each trial but caused the rewards available for both options to increase.  
Performance correlations were observed between the tasks. The proportion of 
optimal selections in the history-dependent task was negatively correlated with 
proportion of optimal selections in the history-independent task r(37) = -.285, p = .083, 
though marginally significant.  
Modeling 
The data from each condition were fit with the Reinforcement Learning and 
WSLS models as described in Chapter 1. We compared the negative log likelihood values 
of these two models by subtracting the fit of the Win-Stay Lose-Shift model from the fit 
of the Reinforcement Learning model. Positive values of the WSLS difference metric 
indicate that the WSLS model was a better fit for the participant, while negative values 
indicate that the RL model was the better fit for the participant.  
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We first checked to see if relative reliance on the WSLS model was correlated 
with performance in either task. Previous work suggests that reliance on simple heuristic-
based strategies implemented in the WSLS model relative to RL strategies correlates to 
better performance in the history-dependent task, but correlates to worse performance in 
a similar history-independent task (Worthy & Maddox, 2011). In our study we observe 
similar effects: higher relative fit of the WSLS model was positively correlated with 
performance in the history-dependent task, r(37) = .543, p < .001, but negatively 
correlated with performance in the history-independent task, r(37) = -.468, p = .003.  
We also examined individual participants propensity to engage the same strategies 
by analyzing the correlation between relative fit of the WSLS model in the history-
dependent and history-independent conditions, r(37) = .666, p < .001, indicating that 
individuals with high relative fit of the WSLS model in the history-dependent condition 
tended to be better fit by the same model in the history-independent condition. This trend 
was statistically significant regardless of the task that participants completed first (ps < 
.05). In addition, order in which the tasks were presented did not have a significant effect 






Figure 2.1: Chapter 2 Experiment 1 Results.  
Left: Correlation between performance in the history-dependent and history-independent 
tasks. Performance is defined as the proportion of trials on which the optimal choice was 
selected. Right: Correlation between the relative fit of the WSLS model in the two tasks. 
The relative WSLS metric represents the difference in fit between the WSLS and RL 
model, with higher values indicating better fit of the WSLS model.  
 
 In addition to comparing the relative model fit estimated across all 250 trials, we 
also fit each model to each 50-trial block to determine whether the best-fitting model 
changed across the course of the experiment, and whether participants engaged similar 
strategies early or late in the experiment.  
In the history-dependent task, the proportion of participants who were best fit by 
the WSLS model was stable across the course of the experiment (Figure 2.2). In the 
history-independent task, the proportion of participants best fit by the WSLS model 
decreased from 66% in the first block to 37% in the last block. This shift is consistent 
with previous work (e.g. Paul & Ashby, 2015) that suggests that participants in tasks that 
rely on implicit processing may begin with reflective, rule-based strategies before shifting 
to implicit, reflexive strategies.  Relative model fit was strongly correlated between tasks 




Figure 2.2: Relative Model Fit By Block.  
Proportion of participants that were best fit by the Win-Stay Lose-Shift model, relative to 
the Reinforcement Learning model, at each 50-trial block.  
 
We evaluated the generalizability of the WSLS and RL models across tasks using 
the generalization criterion (Busemeyer & Wang, 2000). Similar to Yechiam & 
Busemeyer (2008) and Ahn, Busemeyer, Wagenmakers, & Stout (2008) we utilize the 
within-subjects design to apply the generalization criterion at an individual level by 
fitting each model to each participant’s first task and using their parameter estimates to 
make a prediction for each person for the second task.  
Each model is compared to a baseline model by computing the G2 metric, the 
difference in log-likelihood between the test model and a baseline model that assumes 
equal probabilities of selecting each option. Positive values of G2 imply that the model 
can make better predictions than the baseline model. For each model, we calculate the 



























greater than zero. A proportion greater than .5 indicates that the model is a better fit than 
the baseline model for more than 50% of participants.  
G2 = 2 [LLmodel – LLbaseline] 
The generalization criterion results are presented in Table 2.1. These results show 
that the WSLS model performed better than the RL model for predictions of history-
dependent performance using history-independent parameters, as well as history-
independent performance using history-dependent parameters. The RL model only 
performed better than chance in predicting the history-independent task.  
These results also indicate that generalization from the history-dependent task to 
the history-independent task was better than from the history-independent task to the 
history-dependent task. These results are consistent with previous results (e.g. Ahn et al., 
2008), which speculated that predictions using the generalizability criterion are better 
when the parameters are estimated using tasks that have less payoff variability. Thus, 
predictions using the history-independent task may be lower than those using the history-
dependent task because the rewards given on each trial have a relatively high standard 
deviation.  
 
Table 2.1: Generalization criterion. 
  G2 Index  Proportion Positive  
Predicted History-
Dependent  
RL -28.29 0.50 
WSLS  150.83 0.90 
Predicted History-
Independent  
RL -72.77 0.61 
WSLS  103.55 0.94 
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EXPERIMENT 1 DISCUSSION 
In this study we evaluated the relationship between individuals’ performance in a 
history-dependent task for which available rewards depended on their previous history of 
choices, and a history-independent task for which available rewards were drawn from a 
normal distribution. Previous research suggests that the history-dependent task is 
optimally approached using simple heuristic based strategies, captured by the Win-Stay 
Lose-Shift model, while history-independent decision-making is optimally approached 
using more automatic, reflexive processes captured by reinforcement learning models 
(Worthy & Maddox, 2011). This work utilized a within-subjects approach to determine 
whether individuals showed biases toward one strategy over another, regardless of the 
optimal task strategy.  
Our findings indicate that performance is correlated across tasks. Individuals who 
perform well in the history-dependent task perform poorly on the history-independent 
task, though with a somewhat weak correlation. Perhaps surprisingly, stronger 
correlations were observed in the relative fit of computational models (relative WSLS 
fit), indicating that individuals were engaging the same types of strategies regardless of 
the type of task.  
In Experiment 2, we will determine whether or not individuals rely on the same 
strategies across time. If individuals do rely on the same strategies over time, then 
interventions that seek to change performance will benefit from the use of computational 
modeling to determine whether or not the intervention successfully modifies strategy 
engagement.  
EXPERIMENT 2: STABILITY OF DECISION-MAKING STRATEGIES ACROSS TIME  
The findings of Experiment 1 lead us to believe that individuals are biased toward 
decision-making strategies independent of the type of decision-making task in which they 
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are engaged. A second question that we would like to answer is whether or not the 
reliance on specific strategies persists over time. One possibility is that individuals who 
rely on a given strategy will continue to rely on the same strategy, even after several 
hours or days have passed. The other possibility is that reliance on different strategies is 
more random and varies based on a number of potential factors, such as mood, time of 
day, energy, etc.  
The stability of decision-making strategy reliance (at baseline) is particularly 
important when considering long-term training studies. In later chapters we strive to 
change decision-making behavior using single-session techniques and long-term training. 
Two key assumptions in these training studies are that individuals have a natural bias 
toward certain decision-making strategies, and that these strategies, without intervention, 
are relatively stable. The following study tests the assumption that decision-making 
strategies are stable by administering the same decision-making task to individuals 
separated by one week and assessing their relative reliance on WSLS and RL strategies.  
EXPERIMENT 2 METHOD 
Participants 
University of Texas undergraduate students (N = 36) were recruited from the 
University and received research credit for the Introduction to Psychology course.  
Procedure 
Participants were told that they were signing up for a two-part study. In the first 
session participants completed a decision-making task with either martian oxygen or 
house painting surface features. Six-to-eight days later participants completed their 
second session, which consisted of the decision-making task with the alternate surface 
feature. Participants were not told that it was the same decision-making task.  
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Each participant was randomly assigned to the history-dependent (n = 17) or the 
history-independent task (n = 19). The reward structure was consistent between the two 
sessions. The reward structures in this experiment were identical to the reward structures 
used in Chapter 1.  
RESULTS 
Performance in each task was measured using the proportion of optimal 
selections. For the history dependent task, this was the option that provided the lower 
immediate reward but caused the rewards available for both options to increase. For the 
history-independent task the optimal selection was the option that provided the higher 
average reward, 65 points. First we evaluated the relationship between decision-making 
performances across the span of one week.  
In the history-dependent task, performance was correlated over the span of one 
week, r(16) = .538, p = .026. However, relative model fit (as calculated in Chapter 1), 
showed a stronger correlation between the two sessions, r(16) = .641, p = .006, indicating 
that relative fit of WSLS or RL strategies was correlated across time.  
For the history-independent task, performance on the first session was correlated 
with performance in the second session, r(18) = .459, p = .048. Relative model fit was 
also correlated, though marginally significant, between the first and second session of the 




Figure 2.3: Chapter 2 Experiment 2 Results.  
Top Left: Correlation between day 1 and day 2 performance in the history-dependent 
task. Top Right: Correlation between relative model fit (relative WSLS fit) on day 1 and 
day 2 for the history-dependent task. Bottom Left: Correlation between day 1 and day 2 
performance in the history-independent task. Bottom Right: Correlation between relative 
model fit (relative WSLS fit) on day 1 and day 2 for the history-independent task.  
EXPERIMENT 2 DISCUSSION 
The results of Experiment 2 indicate that decision-making is relatively stable over 
a period of one week. For both the history-dependent decision-making task and the 
history-independent decision-making task, individuals performed similarly during their 
first session and their second session. Importantly, the relative model fits were also 
correlated across time. This indicates that individuals not only performed similarly in the 
task across time, but also relied on the same strategies across time.  
The stability of decision-making strategies across time is particularly important 
when considering strategies for modifying decision-making behavior. This study 
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relatively stable. If decision-making performance is to be modified, studies should seek to 
change the strategies that are being utilized by participants.  
CHAPTER 2 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The findings of Experiment 1 indicate that individuals are biased toward decision-
making strategies regardless of the optimal strategy for the type of task. This indicates 
that group differences observed in decision-making studies, such as differences between 
age groups and other individual differences, might be attributable to reliance on different 
strategies—in particular a bias toward strategies that are sub-optimal to the type of task 
that is being tested. Importantly, future studies that identify a group decision-making 
deficit should examine performance in other types of decision-making—if a group deficit 
is attributable to engagement of a competing system, the group may actually show an 
advantage in alternate task types. This is already evident in current work where older 
adults show deficits in history-independent decision-making, but advantages in history-
dependent decision-making (Worthy et al., 2011).  
This work also has implications for training studies. If groups show deficits in 
certain types of decision-making, approaches at modifying decision-making performance 
may focus on trying to shift engagement from reflective strategies to reflexive strategies 
(or vice-versa). Additionally, the findings of Experiment 2 indicate that these biases in 
reliance on particular decision-making strategies, captured by computational models, 
persist over time. The stability of decision-making strategies without intervention is an 
important consideration for future studies that seek to change decision-making 
performance. Specifically, participants did not shift from one strategy to another simply 
because they were exposed to the reward structure multiple times, and performance was 
relatively stable. Future studies that seek to change decision-making performance with 
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long-term training would benefit from pre and post measurements using the same 
decision-making task so that changes in model fits can be assessed. 
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Chapter 3: Depression, Attention, and Decision-Making  
One group with known deficits in both history-dependent and history-independent 
decision-making is individuals with elevated symptoms of depression (e.g. Beevers et al., 
2013; Maddox et al., 2012). We hypothesize that these deficits are due to different 
underlying causes. Depression is associated with declines in working memory, planning, 
and problem solving. These reflective processing deficits are hypothesized to underlie the 
history-dependent decision-making deficit. Depression is also associated with attenuated 
implicit reward sensitivity and biased attention to negative information. These reflexive 
processing deficits are hypothesized to underlie the history-independent decision-making 
deficit. Thus, increasing the engagement of working memory processes should improve 
history-dependent decision-making, while modifying implicit attention to positive and/or 
negative stimuli should improve history-independent decision-making. We test this by 
exploring the effects of attention training in Chapter 3 and working memory training in 
Chapter 4.  
EXPERIMENT 1: ATTENTION TRAINING AND HISTORY-INDEPENDENT DECISION-
MAKING (COOPER, GORLICK, WORTHY, BEEVERS & MADDOX, 2014) 
Recent research suggests that biases in attention toward negative stimuli can be 
altered with targeted training. MacLeod and colleagues (2002) showed that attention 
training could create a negative bias in healthy individuals. Similarly, Wadlinger and 
Isaacowitz (2008) found that healthy individuals trained to direct attention toward 
positive stimuli spent less time viewing negative images, demonstrating a learned 
aversion to negative stimuli. This work suggests that attention training may have 
potential therapeutic value (Hakamata et al., 2010; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). Building 
upon this work, Wells and Beevers (2010) used a variant of the dot-probe task (MacLeod, 
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Mathews, & Tata, 1986) to train depressed individuals to shift attention away from 
negative images. Depressed individuals in the active attention training condition showed 
a reduced bias toward negative items and reported significant reductions in depressive 
symptoms two weeks post-training compared to control participants.  
In the present research we use a variant of Wells and Beevers’ attention training 
paradigm to direct attention toward positive information in order to improve reward-
based decision-making. During training, participants viewed positive and neutral word 
pairs followed by a dot probe.  In the active attention training condition, positive words 
predicted the probe location 85% of the time, whereas in the placebo training condition, 
neither word type (neutral or positive) predicted the probe location. Thus, the training 
paradigm implicitly trained participants to shift their attention toward positive 
information. 
Following training, participants completed a decision-making task similar to that 
used in Beevers et al. (2013). One concern about the task used in Beevers et al. was that 
the reward values for each option were too dramatically different, making the task too 
easy and subsequently diminishing performance differences associated with depression. 
Thus, the present study increased the variability of each option. This increased variability 
in the reward structure makes the task more challenging by requiring participants to learn 
the value of each option by taking rewards over several trials into consideration, as 
opposed to responding only to the most recently received reward. This is important 
because previous research suggests that depressed individuals are impaired at integrating 
reward history over time (Pizzagalli et al., 2008). Supporting this idea, our prior work 
(Beevers et al., 2013) found that depressed individuals were more likely to alter their 
expected values for each option based on recently received rewards, whereas non-
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depressed control participants relied on a longer sequence of previous rewards in 
determining expected reward value.  
Taken together, we make the following predictions. First, we predict that 
individuals with elevated depressive symptoms who receive placebo attention training 
will show a decision-making performance deficit relative to those without depressive 
symptoms. Second, we predict that individuals with elevated depressive symptoms who 
receive active attention training toward positive stimuli will show enhanced performance 
compared to those in the placebo training condition.  
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were seventy-five undergraduate students who completed the study as 
a part of a research requirement for an introduction to psychology course. Participants 
completed the short form of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1993) 
during a pre-testing survey battery. Participants whose scores were above 7 on the short 
form of the BDI-SF were contacted about participating in the high CES-D groups, while 
participants whose scores were below 7 on the short form were contacted about 
participating in the low CES-D control group.  
Table 3.1: Chapter 3 Experiment 1 demographic characteristics 
 Low CES-D High CES-D 
  No Training Placebo Training Active Training 
Sample size 33 22 20 
CES-D: mean (sd)  6.58 (3.21) 26.95 (5.94) 28.9 (6.71)  
*Standard deviations in parentheses.  
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Procedure 
 At the beginning of the experimental session all participants completed a 
demographic form and a series of computer-based questionnaires that included the Center 
for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977). The CES-D 
scores were used to verify that participants were still experiencing depressive symptoms 
at the time of testing and to validate previously recorded BDI scores. Participants with 
elevated levels of self-reported depressive symptoms were randomly assigned to the 
attention training or placebo training groups. Participants were not told that depression 
was a measure of interest and were not told anything about their group membership. It is 
also important to note that the term “training” was not mentioned to the participants until 
they were debriefed at the end of the experiment. This ensured that the participants were 
unaware of the study’s purpose as well as experimental condition.  
 For the placebo training and active training groups, participants completed 
three blocks (all in the same session) of the attention-training task, approximately fifteen 
minutes each. Each block consisted of 168 trials for a total of 504 trials. Before and after 
training participants completed a two-item questionnaire about their current mood. 
Participants were given two minutes between each block to relax before starting the next 
block. Immediately following training, participants completed the decision-making task. 
The low CES-D group completed the decision-making task immediately following 
completion of demographic information and questionnaires.  
 Following convention (Weissman & Sholomskas, 1977), participants who scored 
15 or less on the CES-D were classified as having low depressive symptoms, and 
participants who obtained a 16 or greater were classified as having elevated depressive 
symptoms. CES-D scores of 16 or greater reflect moderate or greater symptoms of 
depression (Radloff, 1977). A cut-point of 16 on the CES-D has very good sensitivity and 
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specificity for the prediction of current major depressive disorder (Beekman et al., 1997). 
Participants were only included in the analysis if their CES-D score (16 or higher for the 
elevated depressive symptom groups and 15 or lower for the non-depressive group), was 
consistent with their classification from the previously recorded BDI-SF score, resulting 
in the exclusion of 17 participants and final participant counts of: 20 high CES-D 
participants in the active attention-training group, 22 high CES-D participants in the 
placebo training control group, and 33 in the low CES-D control group.  
Attention Training 
 This task was designed to train participants’ attention toward positive information 
(i.e., words) using a modified dot-probe paradigm. The task used neutral and positive 
words from the Affective Norms for English Words list (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999). 
Words were matched for letter length and frequency of use in the English language. 
Therefore, the only differences between the list of positive and neutral words were 
valence and arousal.  
 The attention-training task is displayed in Figure 3.1. Each trial of the task began 
with a 500-ms presentation of a fixation-cross. Following the cross, a pair of stimuli, a 
positive word and a neutral word, were randomly presented to the right and the left side 
of the computer screen for 1000-ms. A dot-probe (i.e., * or **) appeared behind one 
of the previously displayed words. This probe appeared on the screen until the 
participant pressed one of two response buttons to indicate the identity of the probe (1 or 
2 asterisks). In the active training condition, the probe was presented in the location 
associated with the positive word on 85% of the trials and the neutral word on 15% of the 
trials. In the placebo training condition, the probe was presented in the location of the 
neutral word on 50% of the trials and in the location of the positive word on 50% of the 
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trials. In both conditions, the positive word appeared randomly and equally on either 
side of the screen. As in previous research (Wells & Beevers, 2010) we used 85% 
positive rather than 100% in the training condition to keep the intent of the study from 
being transparent.  
 
Figure 3.1: Attention Training Details.  
In the placebo training condition the positive and neutral words each preceded the dot-
probe with equal probability. In the active training condition the positive word preceded 
the dot-probe on 85% of trials.  
Decision-Making Task 
 The decision-making task was identical to the history-independent decision-
making task used in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.3). Participants performed a total of 150 trials, 
and were told nothing about the nature of the reward structure. In this two-option task, 
the average reward for the sub-optimal option is 55 points (units of oxygen), while the 
average reward for the optimal option is 65 points. However, because the standard 
deviation around the mean reward for each option is 15 units it is not the case that the 
optimal option yields a larger reward on every trial. 
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RESULTS 
 The mean CES-D scores for the active-training and placebo-training groups were 
35.20 and 33.23, respectively. These did not differ significantly, t(40) = .800, p = .429, 
Cohen’s d = .252. The mean CES-D score for the low CES-D group was 7.70, 
significantly lower than both the active training and placebo training groups (ps < .001).  
 Performance in the decision-making task was measured by analyzing the 
proportion of trials on which participants selected the optimal choice (the higher average 
reward) throughout the experiment.  We used one-sample t-tests to determine whether 
performance significantly exceeded chance. Performance exceeded chance in the active 
attention training group (M = .69), t(19) = 6.527, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.995, the 
placebo training group (M = .61), t(21) = 3.118, p = .005, Cohen’s d = 1.361, and the 
non-depressive group (M = .72), t(32) = 7.595, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.685. Thus, all 
groups learned to select the optimal choice. 
 We next used an ANOVA to examine the effect of group (placebo training, 
attention training, low CES-D) on the proportion of optimal selections (Figure 3.2). We 
observed an overall effect of group, F(2,72) = 3.786, p = .027, partial-η2 = .095. There 
was also a significant linear contrast, F(1,72) = 7.472, p = .008, partial-η2 = .094. As 
predicted, the participants who received placebo training selected the optimal choice less 
often than the low CES-D group, t(53) = 2.573, p = .013, Cohen’s d = .707. Also as 
predicted, the participants who received placebo training selected the optimal choice less 
often than the participants who received active attention training t(40) = 1.828, p = .06, 
Cohen’s d = .578. There was not a statistically significant difference in performance 
across the attention-trained participants and the low CES-D control group, t(51) = .786, p 
= .436, Cohen’s d = .220.  
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Figure 3.2: Chapter 3 Experiment 1 Performance.  
Performance measured by proportion of optimal selections in the decision-making task. 
Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
 The mood scores that were collected before and after the training procedure were 
also analyzed. Participants rated their current mood on two nine-point scales, from ‘not 
happy at all’ to ‘very happy’, and from ‘not sad at all’ to ‘very sad’. Pre and post mood 
scores were compared for both the placebo training and active attention training groups 
using paired t-tests. The pre and post mood scores were not significantly different for 
either question for either group (ps>.1), indicating that changes in decision-making 
performance were not attributable to conscious changes in mood.  
 We also looked at correlations between CES-D score and performance on the 
decision-making task. Across all subjects who did not receive active attention training 
(low CES-D controls and high CES-D placebo training) CES-D scores were negatively 
correlated with task performance as indicated by proportion of optimal selections r(53) = 
-.296, p = .03. Interestingly, this trend was present in the non-depressed group, r(31) = -
.339, p = .05, indicating that depressive symptoms may have a negative relationship with 























depression. Correlations within the active training and placebo training groups were not 
significant (ps > .1).   
Modeling 
In the present study we use a variation of the Reinforcement Learning model to 
focus on learning from positive and negative information. This differs from previous 
chapters in that we are focusing on differences within the reinforcement-learning model, 
rather than reliance on the RL model relative to the heuristic-based WSLS model. We 
focus on the more complex RL model because we want to know how attention training 
modifies attention to rewards in the decision-making task.  
 The basic RL model accounts for decision-making behavior by updating expected 
reward values (EVs) for each option, i, on each trial, t, in Equation 3.1, based on 
prediction error δ:  
δ =" # − %&',)  (3.1) 
Prediction errors are used to update EVs each time an option is chosen based on the 
following update rule: 
%&',)*+ = 	%&',) + 	/ ∙ 1    (3.2) 
The recency parameter (α), 0≤α≤1, weighs the degree to which participants update 
the expected values for each option based on their most recently received rewards. The 
expected values for each option are used to determine the probabilities for selecting each 
option by the Softmax decision rule (Sutton & Barto, 1998): 
 
2 3', # = 	
4[6∙78 9:,; ]
4[6∙78 9=,; ]>=?@
   (3.3) 
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Where θ is an inverse temperature parameter representing the degree to which the option 
with the highest EV is chosen.  Higher values of θ indicate that the highest valued option 
is chosen more often.  
 Individuals with depressive symptoms show enhanced punishment processing but 
deficient reward processing. Punishments are directly associated with negative prediction 
errors and rewards with positive prediction errors.  To explore positive and negative 
reward prediction errors mechanistically we extended the model to account separately for 
positive and negative prediction errors. We let the model freely estimate two learning rate 
parameters that were used to update EVs in Equation 3.2 when prediction errors were 
positive (αpos) or negative (αneg).  
 One aspect of standard RL models is an assumption that on any given trial EVs 
for each option are represented by a single numerical value.  An alternative assumption is 
that EVs are represented in the form of distributions around a mean value, rather than an 
exact single value.  This assumption has been highlighted in recent RL and associative 
learning work (Doll, Jacobs, Sanfey, & Frank, 2009; Frank, Doll, Oas-Terpstra, & 
Moreno, 2009; Kruschke, 2008), and is likely more realistic in environments with 
variable rewards provided on each trial. This model assumes that the mean EV for the 
distribution of EVs is a recency-weighted average of past rewards for each option, as 
updated in Equation 3.1, and that Noise (N) around each mean is a recency-weighted 
average of the squared prediction errors on each trial: 
 
A',)*+ = 	A',) + 	/B ∙ [1C − A',)]     (3.4) 
The degree to which the noise estimates are updated based on the most recent prediction 
errors is modulated by a recency parameter (αN), 0≤ αN ≤1, similar to how EVs are 
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updated in Equation 3.2 above.  We also fit the model with separate αN parameters for 
trials with positive and negative prediction errors.  This approach is similar to recent 
approaches that have approximated noise, or the variance in the most likely outcome for 
each choice option by tracking the variance in recent outcomes (Doll et al., 2009; Nassar, 
Wilson, Heasly, & Gold, 2010).   
 The initial N estimate for each option (N0) is a free parameter that represents 
initial uncertainty regarding the average reward provided by each option.  The Extended 
RL model includes this noise term in the Softmax rule to allow the model to account for 
behavior where participants select options that they have greater or lesser uncertainty 




     (3.5) 
 As in the Basic RL model we set a minimum value of 0 on θ, but we allowed θN to 
be positive or negative.  Positive values indicate a greater preference for options that have 
greater uncertainty, while negative values indicate a greater preference for options with 
lesser uncertainty.  Thus, the addition of the noise term allows us to account for behavior 
where participants attempt to reduce uncertainty regarding the noise around each 
expected reward value.   
 The Extended RL model has seven free parameters: αpos, αneg, αN(pos), αN(neg), N0, θ, 
and θN, while the Basic RL model has two free parameters: α, and θ. We compared the 
relative fits of these two models using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) of each 
model, which rewards goodness of fit but also includes a penalty for increasing the 
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number of free parameters (Akaike, 1974). This was done to ensure that the increase in 
relative fit of the model was not outweighed by the flexibility of additional parameters.  
 The final model that we fit, the baseline (or null) model, assumes fixed choice 
probabilities (Worthy et al., 2011; Gureckis & Love, 2009; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 
2005). The baseline model has one free parameter that represents the probability of 
selecting one of the two options on any given trial.  This model does not assume that 
participants learn from rewards given on each trial, yet it provides a good fit for data 
when participants repeatedly choose the same option (Gureckis & Love, 2009).   
Model-Based Predictions 
 We believe that the observed behavioral differences can be attributed to increased 
attention to negative information in the placebo-trained group with elevated depressive 
symptoms, and that increased attention to negative information results in increased 
learning when prediction errors are negative, ultimately causing over-adjustment of the 
expected value for that option. In the extended RL model negative and positive reward 
prediction errors update the expected values for each option with separate learning rates 
(recency parameters), allowing the model to account for differential learning from 
positive and negative prediction errors. Consistent with previous work reporting 
hypersensitivity to negative feedback and punishment (i.e. Eshel & Roiser, 2010), we 
would expect increased attention to negative information to result in increased learning 
rates for negative prediction errors.  As attention training is thought to reduce this bias, 
we would expect to see reduced learning rates (lower recency parameter) for negative 
prediction errors in the attention-trained group relative to the placebo-trained group. 
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Modeling Results 
 We fit each participant’s data individually with the models detailed above. The 
models were fit on a trial-by-trial basis to the participant’s response and the parameters 
were estimated using maximum likelihood. We used Akaike Weights (Wagenmakers & 
Farrell, 2004) to compare the relative fits of the models.  The Akaike Weights are derived 
from Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC: Akaike, 1974), which is defined for each 
model i as: 
AIC' = 	−2LogM' + 2&'     (3.6) 
where Li is the maximum likelihood for model i and Vi is the number of free parameters 
in the model. Notice that the AIC measure penalizes the model for each additional free 
parameter.  
 The AIC values were used to generate the Akaike Weight for each of the three 
models for each participant. The relative likelihood, L, of each model, i, is computed 




∙ ∆'(AIC)}    (3.7) 
where Δi(AIC) represents the difference between the AIC for that model and the lowest 
AIC of all candidate models. The relative likelihoods of each candidate model are then 







      (3.8) 
These Akaike weights can be interpreted as the probability that the model is the best 
model for the data given the data set from the set of candidate models (Wagenmakers & 
Farrell, 2004). 
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 We computed Akaike weights for each model for each participant. Figure 3.3 
shows the average Akaike weights for each condition. The Extended RL model was 
clearly the best fitting model for all groups.  
 
Figure 3.3: Chapter 3 Experiment 1 Modeling Results.  
Akaike weights compare goodness of fit for the Baseline model, Softmax RL model, and 
Extended RL model. Higher Akaike weights indicate better fit. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean.  
 Within the Extended RL model, our main parameters of interest were the learning 
rates for negative reward prediction errors and positive reward prediction errors (Figure 
3.4). We observed no main effect of group within the learning rate for positive prediction 
errors (p>.1); however, we observed a main effect of group in learning from negative 
prediction errors F(2,72) = 2.910, p = .061, and a significant linear contrast, F(1,72) = 
5.755, p = .019, partial-η2 = .074. In decomposing this effect we found that the high CES-



















errors than the low CES-D group, t(53) = 2.441, p = .018, Cohen’s d = .670; the same 
learning rate parameter for the attention-trained group was intermediate between these 
two groups.  
 
Figure 3.4: Chapter 3 Experiment 1 Learning Rates.  
Learning rate parameter values for positive and negative reward prediction errors. Error 
bars represent standard error of the mean.   
EXPERIMENT 1 DISCUSSION 
 The overriding aim of the present study was to determine whether an attention 
training procedure that was successful in ameliorating depressive symptoms might be 
used to attenuate the deficit in decision-making. In line with previous research (Beevers 
et al., 2013; Kunisato et al., 2012; Maddox et al., 2012) we found that individuals with 
elevated depressive symptoms showed performance deficits in maximizing rewards. 
Importantly, this performance deficit was significantly attenuated when given attention 
training towards positive stimuli prior to performing the decision-making task. In fact, 
performance of the active attention-trained group was no different from that of the low 

















 It should be noted that the performance differences associated with depressive 
symptoms in this task were much greater than the performance differences observed in 
Beevers et al. (2013). This is probably attributable to the different reward structures 
underlying the previously published paper and the current study. The task in the previous 
paper had a clear separation between the optimal and suboptimal choices, where the 
lowest reward for the “good” option was still higher than the highest reward from the 
“bad” option. Thus, because the rewards never overlapped, the task was relatively easy 
and few performance or strategy differences were observed between the groups. These 
findings are consistent with the idea that depression has less of an effect on easier, 
automatic processing, but has a greater effect on more demanding tasks (Hartlage, Alloy, 
Vázquez, & Dykman, 1993; Hertel, 1994).  
 Computational modeling was utilized to better understand the strategies being 
used by each group to solve the decision-making task. Analysis of the best-fitting model 
parameters suggests that of the three groups, the placebo-trained group had the highest 
learning rate for negative prediction errors and the greatest discrepancy in learning from 
negative prediction errors relative to positive prediction errors.  These findings indicate 
that individuals with elevated depressive symptoms may place too much weight on 
immediate rewards, particularly when these rewards are less than expected, resulting in 
overcorrection of their expected value for the rewarded option. This is consistent with 
previous research demonstrating that people with high depressive symptoms were more 
likely to alter their expected values based on recently received rewards (Beevers et al., 
2013).  
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EXPERIMENT 2: ATTENTION TRAINING AND HISTORY-DEPENDENT DECISION-MAKING 
 In Experiment 1 we explored the effectiveness of attention training procedures in 
attenuating deficits associated with depression in history-independent decision-making. 
In the next experiment, we test this training mechanism on history-dependent decision-
making. Critically, the history-independent decision-making task in Experiment 1 differs 
from the history-dependent task in that optimal performance relies on the use of 
automatic attention to recent rewards, not effortful memories of reward structures. It is 
thus unclear whether reflexive training benefits will generalize to a reflective decision-
making task.  
 The history-dependent task, used in the present study, is widely used to assess 
reflective decision-making ability (e.g. Cooper, Worthy, Gorlick, & Maddox, 2013; 
Gureckis & Love, 2009; Maddox et al., 2012; Worthy et al., 2011). In this task, the 
rewards available on a given trial are dependent on the participant’s recent history of 
choices. Optimal performance requires the participant to forego the larger immediate 
reward in order to maximize future rewards. In short, participants must retain information 
in working memory regarding the choices they make as well as the rewards that they 
receive for each choice, update the information when new rewards are received, and 
reflect back on their experiences to determine how rewards change over time. 
 One hypothesis for Experiment 2 is that the reflective decision-making deficit 
observed in individuals with elevated depressive symptoms is due to the same bias 
towards negative feedback and away from positive feedback that mediates the reflexive 
decision-making deficit. If this hypothesis is correct, the reflexive attention training 
procedure used in Experiment 1 should be successful in attenuating the deficit in the 
reflective decision-making task. Alternately, a hypothesis that we consider to be more 
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likely is that the deficit in history-dependent decision-making is associated with deficits 
in reflective processes that will not be attenuated with attention-training mechanisms.  
METHOD 
Participants 
 One hundred and ten undergraduate students completed the study as a part of a 
research requirement for an introduction to psychology course. Participants completed 
the short form of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-SF; Beck & Steer, 1993) during a 
pre-testing survey battery. Participants whose scores were above 7 on the short form of 
the BDI-SF were contacted about participating (to fill the high depressive symptom 
groups), while participants whose scores were below 7 on the short form were also 
contacted about participating (for the low CES-D control group). Participants were not 
told that depression was a measure of interest and were given no information about their 
group status. See Table 3.2 for demographic information. 
Table 3.2: Chapter 3 Experiment 2 demographic characteristics.  
 Low CES-D  High CES-D 
  No Training Placebo Training Active Training 
Sample size 37 37 36 
Age: mean (sd)  21.54 (4.27) 19.32 (1.13) 19.17 (1.38)  
Gender: m/f  14/23 13/24 13/23 
CES-D: mean (sd)  8.54 (3.76) 29.24 (8.23) 27.56 (7.96)  
*Standard deviations in parentheses.  
 
Materials and Procedure 
 At the beginning of the experimental session all participants completed a 
demographic form and a series of computer-based questionnaires that included the Center 
for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977). The CES-D 
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scores were used to validate previously recorded BDI scores. Following convention 
(Weissman & Sholomskas, 1977), participants who scored 15 or less on the CES-D were 
classified as having low depressive symptoms, and participants who obtained a 16 or 
greater were classified as having elevated depressive symptoms, reflecting moderate or 
greater symptoms of depression (Radloff, 1977). Participants with mismatched 
classification on the BDI-SF and CES-D were not included. 
 Participants with high depressive symptoms were assigned to placebo training (n 
= 37) or active attention training (n = 36). Non-depressive individuals only participated in 
the no training control condition (n = 37). Immediately following attention training, 
participants completed the decision-making task. The no-training group did not undergo 
training and completed the decision-making task immediately following the completion 
of demographic information and questionnaires.  
Reflexive Attention Training  
 We used a variant of Wells and Beevers’ (2010) attention training paradigm to 
implicitly direct attention towards positive information. The attention-training task is 
identical to the task used in Experiment 1.  
Decision-Making Task  
 On each of the 150 trials the participant chose between two extraction systems, 
represented by a red system and a blue system. A bar on the right side of the screen 
would show the amount of oxygen that had been extracted on that trial, the collected 
oxygen would be moved to the cumulative tank, and the next trial would begin. 
Participants were given a goal to collect as much oxygen as possible. The rewards 
structure used in this experiment is identical to the history-dependent decision-making 
task reward structure in Chapter 1.  
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RESULTS 
 The mean CES-D scores for the groups with depressive symptoms (active, 
placebo) were 27.56 (SD = 7.96) and 29.24 (SD = 8.23), respectively. Mean CES-D score 
did not differ across the two training groups (p = .376). The mean CES-D score for the 
non-depressive group was 8.54 (SD = 3.76) and was significantly lower than both of the 
groups with depressive symptoms (ps < .001).  
 Performance in the decision-making task was measured using the proportion of 
trials on which the optimal choice was selected (Figure 3.5). We conducted an ANOVA 
on the effect of condition, which was non-significant F(2, 107) = 2.158, p = .121, partial-
η2 = .039. This suggests that active attention training was not effective in attenuating the 
reflective decision-making deficit observed in individuals with elevated depressive 
symptoms.  
 
Figure 3.5: Chapter 3 Experiment 2 Performance.  
Performance is measured as the proportion of trials on which the optimal choice is 
























 The attention training mechanism had little effect on strategy utilization in the 
history-dependent decision-making task. Figure 3.6 shows the Akaike weight of each 
model for each of the three groups. The condition x model ANOVA indicated a non-
significant interaction F(4,321)  = 1.791, p = .130, partial-η2 = .022  The Akaike weight 
of the WSLS model was numerically lower in the active attention training condition (M = 
.72), as compared to the placebo training condition (M = .84), although this difference 
was not significant (p = .210) 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Chapter 3 Experiment 2 Modeling Results.  
Akaike weights compare goodness of fit for the baseline model, RL model, and WSLS 
model. Higher Akaike weights indicate better fit. Error bars represent standard error of 
the mean.  
DISCUSSION 
 The results of Experiment 2 indicate that the reflexive attention-training 
procedure previously used to attenuate depression-related deficits in reflexive decision-



















reflective decision-making. We hypothesize that this lack of effect is due to different 
processes that mediate performance in the two types of decision-making tasks. Reflective 
decision-making, associated with the history-dependent task, is dependent on explicit 
processing (i.e. working memory) that is not affected by attention training.  
CHAPTER 3 DISCUSSION 
 Individuals with major depression and elevated depressive symptoms face 
physical, social and cognitive challenges. The presence of depressive symptoms is 
associated with increased attention to negative information and decreased attention to 
positive information. This reward processing deficit has broad effects on cognition, 
including one’s ability to make good decisions (Beevers et al., 2013; Kunisato et al., 
2012; Maddox et al., 2012; Pizzagalli et al., 2008). Recent research suggests that these 
reward processing deficits may be malleable and can be attenuated with attention training 
(Wells & Beevers, 2010). In Experiment 1, we successfully used attention-training 
mechanisms to modify decision-making performance, resulting in improved decision-
making performance.  
 The task used in Experiment 1 was a history-independent decision-making task in 
which the participant must integrate reinforcement history over time to determine which 
option has the highest expected value. The best-fitting model for this task was a variation 
of a reinforcement-learning model, a class of models that are commonly associated with 
implicit, automatic processing. As such, the task used in Experiment 1 is often referred to 
as a reflexive task. Alternately, reflective decision-making depends on the ability to 
utilize working memory resources to determine how rewards change over time, 
demonstrated in Chapter 1. In Experiment 2, we found that attention training toward 
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positive stimuli is ineffective at attenuating the deficit in history-dependent decision-
making that is associated with symptoms of depression (Maddox et al., 2012).  
 Taken together, the results of Chapter 3 indicate that attention-training 
mechanisms show promise for modifying cognitive behavior that specifically results from 
processing of rewards, particularly at an implicit level. In Chapter 4 we continue to 
explore the depression-related deficit in the history-dependent decision-making task. 
Given the reliance of this task on working memory and explicit processing (Worthy et al., 
2012; Chapter 1), we hypothesize that successful attenuation of the history-dependent 
decision-making deficit will depend on methods to increase the engagement of working 
memory and explicit processes. 
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Chapter 4: Depression, Working Memory, and Decision-Making 
(Cooper, Gorlick, Worthy, Koslov, Beevers & Maddox, in prep) 
 A large body of work identifies cognitive deficits related to depressive symptoms 
in tasks that involve effortful, reflective information processing, such as problem solving 
(Elderkin-Thompson, Mintz, Haroon, Lavretsky, & Kumar, 2006), planning (Rogers et 
al., 2004), cognitive flexibility (Butters et al., 2004), and memory (Burt, Zembar, & 
Niederehe, 1995). With these cognitive difficulties in mind, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
decision-making deficits associated with depressive symptoms are observed in a number 
of studies. Work from our lab identifies deficits associated with depressive symptoms in 
multiple decision-making tasks (Blanco, Otto, Maddox, Beevers, & Love, 2013; Maddox, 
Gorlick, Worthy, & Beevers, 2012), including those that involve more automatic, 
reflexive processing (Cooper, Gorlick, Denny, Worthy, Beevers & Maddox, 2014), as 
well as robust deficits in effortful, reflective processing (Maddox et al., 2012). The focus 
of the current chapter is the observed deficit in reflective history-dependent decision-
making (Maddox et al., 2012).  
 We hypothesize that the previously observed difficulty in reflective decision-
making for individuals with elevated depressive symptoms is due (at least in part) to 
deficits in planning and working memory (Maddox et al., 2012).  In the current work 
(Experiment 1) we test whether engaging in a high-demand reflective working-memory 
task will improve performance for individuals with elevated depressive symptoms in a 
subsequent reflective decision-making task.  
 The reflective decision-making task in this study requires participants to forego a 
higher immediate reward in order to maximize long-term rewards and is known to 
depend heavily on working memory processes (Worthy, Otto, & Maddox, 2012). 
Participants with working memory resources limited by a concurrent dual-task develop a 
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preference for maximizing immediate reward and perform worse than participants who 
do not have the concurrent dual-task (Worthy et al, 2012). In the same decision-making 
task, individuals with elevated depressive symptoms perform worse than individuals 
without depressive symptoms (Maddox et al., 2012), a deficit that may be attributable to 
reduced working memory associated with depression (i.e. Christopher & MacDonald, 
2005; Joorman and Gotlib, 2008). 
 Engagement of working memory shows transfer effects on subsequent reflective 
tasks (Chein & Morrison, 2010; Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides, & Perrig, 2008). For 
example, working memory training over the course of 8 to 19 days with a tailored n-back 
test leads to improvements in the ability to reason and to solve new problems (Jaeggi et 
al., 2008). Likewise, training with a novel working memory task over the course of four 
weeks promotes increases in reading comprehension (Chein & Morrison, 2010). The 
purpose of our working-memory procedure is to exercise working memory using a 
single-session procedure and to encourage the engagement of working memory resources 
in a subsequent decision-making task. While it is possible that this will increase working 
memory capacity, this is not our expectation. However, if this procedure is successful in 
producing short-term improvements in decision-making then a longer-term training study 
will be warranted.  
 We hypothesize that working memory engagement should enhance subsequent 
reflective decision-making performance. To test this hypothesis, we implement a 
modified automated operational span procedure (Ospan; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & 
Engle, 2005), a task for which participants must remember sequences of letters that are 
presented in between simple math problems. During the retrieval phase, the letters must 
be recalled in the order that they were presented, requiring participants to reflect on the 
information that they stored in working memory. A similar procedure has been used in 
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combination with a symmetry-span task as part of a working-memory training program 
(Harrison et al., 2013).  
 The goal of Experiment 1 is to attenuate the deficit observed in reflective 
decision-making by engaging working memory resources. To examine whether the level 
of working memory engagement interacts with subsequent reflective decision-making 
outcomes, we manipulated the quantity of information held in working memory across 
two conditions: a low span condition and a high span condition. The low span condition 
is designed to be less taxing on working memory. Participants in the low span condition 
are only asked to retain 3-4 items in working memory, similar to the working memory 
necessary to respond in the decision-making task according to only the most recently 
received rewards. Alternately, participants in the high span condition are asked to retain 
6-7 items in working memory, practicing the skills necessary for good performance in a 
reflective decision-making task for which the rewards received across many trials must 
be remembered and compared.  
EXPERIMENT 1: WORKING MEMORY ENGAGEMENT AND HISTORY-DEPENDENT 
DECISION-MAKING 
 We test the hypothesis that deficits in working memory processing are at the heart 
of the reflective decision-making deficit observed in individuals with elevated depressive 
symptoms. Individuals with elevated depressive symptoms complete a low or a high span 
procedure to engage working memory prior to completing the reflective decision-making 
task. We predict that high engagement of working memory before the decision-making 
task will attenuate the reflective decision-making deficit observed in individuals with 




 One hundred and forty-eight undergraduate students completed the study as a part 
of a research requirement for an introduction to psychology course. Demographic 
information can be seen in Table 4.1.   
Table 4.1: Chapter 4 Experiment 1 demographics characteristics. 
 Low CES-D High CES-D 
  Control Control Low-Training  High-Training  
Sample size 37 37 37 37 
Age: mean 
(sd)  
21.46 (3.99)  20.56 (3.89)  19.59 (1.77) 19.46 (2.04)  
Gender: m/f  14/23 9/28 7/30 15/22  
CES-D: 
mean (sd)  
8.03 (3.88)  26.11(7.76) 29.57 (8.05)  29.51 (9.08)  
*Standard deviations in parentheses 
 Participants with high CES-D scores were randomly assigned to the high span 
working memory condition (n = 37) or low span working memory condition (n = 37). A 
second group of control participants with high CES-D scores (n = 37) and low CES-D 
scores (n = 37) were also included. Immediately following reflective working memory 
engagement, participants completed the reflective decision-making task. The control 
groups completed the decision-making task immediately following the completion of 
demographic information and questionnaires.  
Reflective Working Memory Engagement Task 
 A visual representation of the working-memory task can be seen in Figure 4.1. On 
each trial, participants were first shown a math problem for 4000ms (e.g. (3 × 3) - 8 = ?). 
The math problems were simple and involve multiplication, division, addition, and 
subtraction. Following presentation of the math problem, participants were shown a 
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number, representing a potential answer to the math problem, and were required to 
respond if the number was the correct answer by selecting “true” or “false”. Participants 
were provided feedback (correct/incorrect) and shown a letter ('F', 'H', 'J', 'K', 'L', 'N', 'P', 
'Q', 'R', 'S', 'T', or 'Y'; sampled without replacement) for 2000ms, after which another 
math problem was displayed. After the presentation of 3–7 sets of math problems and 
letters, participants were asked to use the keyboard to click the order of the letters that 
they viewed in the last span. Participants were provided sequential feedback about their 
recall accuracy. Their math accuracy score was displayed on the screen (percentage 
accuracy) throughout the experiment, and participants were asked to keep their math 
accuracy above 85%.  
 Participants in the low span condition received spans of 3 and 4-letter length for a 
total of 22 spans with 75 letters. Participants in the high span condition received spans of 
letter length 6 and 7 for a total of 12 spans with 75 letters. The working memory task was 
performed on PC computers using Matlab software with Psychtoolbox 2.54 (Brainard, 
1997; Pelli, 1997). 
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Figure 4.1: Working Memory Training Details.  
In the low span condition participants received spans of 3-4 characters, while participants 
in the high span condition received spans of 6-7 characters.  
  
RESULTS 
 The mean CES-D scores for the groups with depressive symptoms (high span, 
low span, and control) were 29.51 (SD = 9.08), 29.57 (SD = 8.05), and 26.11 (SD = 7.76), 
respectively. Mean CES-D scores did not differ across groups with depressive symptoms, 
F(2, 108) = 2.103, p = .127, partial-η2 = .037. The mean CES-D score for the non-
depressive group was 8.03 (SD = 3.88), significantly lower than all three of the groups 
with depressive symptoms (ps < .001).  
 Performance in the working-memory task was measured using the proportion of 
correct responses. As expected, performance in the low span condition was significantly 
better than performance in the high span condition (Mhigh = .76, SDhigh = .12, Mlow = .92, 
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SDlow = .08), t(72) = 6.621, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.561, indicating that the low span 
condition was less taxing than the high span working memory condition.   
 Performance in the decision-making task was measured by analyzing the 
proportion of trials on which the optimal choice was selected. We first compared 
performance for the non-depressive group with the control group with elevated 
depressive symptoms to determine whether we replicated the performance deficit 
reported in Maddox et al. (2012). Consistent with Maddox et al., we observed a deficit in 
decision-making performance in individuals with elevated symptoms of depression (M = 
.52) relative to the low CES-D group (M = .63), t(72) = 1.928, p = .058, Cohen’s d = 
.454. Next, we conducted an ANOVA to examine the effect of group (low CES-D 
control, high CES-D control, low span, and high span) on performance (Figure 4.2), 
observing a main effect, F(3,144) = 2.681, p = .049, partial-η2 = .053.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Chapter 4 Experiment 1 Performance.  
Performance is measured as the proportion of trials on which the optimal choice is 
























 Individuals in the high span group selected the optimal choice more frequently (M 
= .61) than those in the low span group (M = .50), t(72) = 2.010, p = .048, Cohen’s d = 
.474. Importantly, performance did not differ significantly between the high span group 
and the low CES-D control group (p = .637). Individuals in the low span condition also 
selected the optimal choice less frequently than the low CES-D control group (M = .63), 
t(72) = 2.487, p = .015, Cohen’s d = .586, and were not significantly different from the 
high CES-D control group (p = .741). We repeated all of these analyses using points as 
the performance measure and all results replicated. We further examined these 
performance differences by analyzing the number of trials on which participants switched 
between options, streaks of increasing and decreasing option selections, and reaction 
times after positive and negative reward changes. However, none of these measures 
showed significant group differences (ps > .2).  
Modeling  
 Each participant’s data was fit on a trial-by-trial basis with the Baseline, 
Reinforcement Learning and Win-Stay Lose-Shift models described in detail in Chapters 
1 and 3. In order to compare these models, the Akaike weight for each model was 
calculated for each participant, consistent with the methods and equations described in 
Chapter 3.  
 One possibility for the change in performance associated with the working 
memory task is that it encourages the use of reflective, heuristic-based strategies that are 
dependent on working memory (thus decreasing the use of reflexive, automatic strategies 
that often result in poor performance in this task). We examined whether strategy 
engagement was affected by the working-memory training procedure by comparing the 
Akaike weights for each model in each group. Consistent with previous chapters, we 
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calculated the Akaike weight for each model for each participant and averaged these 
values across participants in each group. We found that a Condition x Model interaction, 
F(6, 432) = 3.173, p = .005, partial-η2 = .042. The Akaike weight of the WSLS model 
was higher in the high CES-D group who completed the high-span working memory 
training procedure (M = .90) than those who did not complete a training procedure (M = 
.74), t(72) = 1.862, p = .067, Cohen’s d = .439. The Akaike weight of the WSLS model 
in the high-span training condition was not different from the low CES-D group (M = 
.90), p = .972. The weight of the WSLS model for the low-span training group (M = .77) 
was intermediate between the no training and high-span training groups, and did not 
significantly differ from either groups, ps > .1.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Chapter 4 Experiment 1 Modeling Results.  
Akaike weights compare goodness of fit for the baseline model, RL model, and WSLS 
model. Higher Akaike weights indicate better fit. Error bars represent standard error of 



















EXPERIMENT 1 DISCUSSION 
 Many decisions benefit from a long-term focus and seeking courses of action that 
will be more rewarding in the future.  People regularly make decisions in which they 
must weigh immediate rewards against delayed rewards concerning education, finances, 
and health choices. In the laboratory, individuals with elevated depressive symptoms 
show deficits in this type of decision-making (Maddox et al., 2012). Improving these 
individuals’ ability to make decisions that maximize future reward could improve quality 
of life in the real world.  
 The current study explores the effects of reflective working memory engagement 
on reflective decision-making performance in individuals with elevated self-reported 
depressive symptoms. Replicating previous results (Maddox et al., 2012), we found that 
individuals with elevated depressive symptoms performed worse than individuals without 
elevated depressive symptoms in a reflective decision-making task. These findings are 
consistent with the idea that reflective history-dependent strategies depend on working 
memory (Worthy et al., 2012) and that depression is associated with working memory 
deficits (Christopher & MacDonald, 2005).  
  We also found that individuals with elevated depressive symptoms who 
completed a highly engaging working memory task performed better in a subsequent 
reflective decision-making task and were no different from those without depressive 
symptoms. This benefit was not observed in individuals who engaged working memory 
at lower levels, indicating that working memory tasks must be adequately challenging to 
show transfer effects in this domain.  
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EXPERIMENT 2: WORKING MEMORY ENGAGEMENT AND HISTORY-INDEPENDENT 
DECISION-MAKING 
 In the previous experiments and chapters, we have tested the effect of attention 
training toward positive stimuli on history-independent and history-dependent decision-
making, and have tested the effect of working memory engagement on history-dependent 
decision-making, but we have yet to test the effect of the working-memory engaging task 
on history-independent decision-making. In the current experiment we test the effect of 
the high and low span working-memory engaging tasks on the history-independent 
decision-making task utilized in Cooper et al., 2014 (Chapter 3).  
 There are three clear possibilities regarding the effect of working memory training 
on history-independent decision-making. One possibility is that working memory training 
would only have an effect on subsequent tasks that depend entirely on reflective 
processing. In this case, our predominate finding of this series of studies would be that 
unique training mechanism are required to improve different types of decision-making, 
with little overlap between effects. Alternately, working memory training could affect 
performance in the history-independent task through two different routes. In Experiment 
1 we found that completion of the high-span working-memory task led to increased 
utilization of WSLS, heuristic-based strategies. Likewise, the working memory task may 
also lead to enhanced use of heuristic-based strategies in the history-independent task.  
 Finally, the working memory task may affect performance in the history-
independent task through a different mechanism than the shift in strategy observed in 
Experiment 1. In Chapter 3 we found that improved performance after attention training 
was associated with lowered learning rates, specifically when prediction errors were 
negative. Instead of responding to the most recently received rewards, rewards were 
integrated over time to develop accurate representations of the expected values of each 
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option. These results are consistent with other work indicating that individuals with 
depression are responsive to delivery of single rewards, but fail to integrate rewards over 
time. Thus, one effect of the working memory task on reflexive strategies might be 
slower updating over a longer reinforcement history, or an increased ability to integrate 
reward information over time. We will use computational modeling to evaluate whether 
differences in learning rates can explain differences in performance, and whether 
differences are in response to positive or negative prediction errors.  
EXPERIMENT 2 METHOD  
 In Experiment 2 we utilize the same working memory training procedure that we 
used in Experiment 1. Immediately following the working memory procedure, 
participants completed 150 trials of the history-independent decision-making task from 
Cooper et al. (2014).  
Participants  
One hundred and fifty-eight undergraduate students completed the study as a part of a 
research requirement for an introduction to psychology course. Demographic information 
can be seen in Table 4.2.   
Table 4.2: Chapter 4 Experiment 2 demographics characteristics. 
 Low CES-D  High CES-D  
  Control Control Low-Training High-Training 
Sample size 41 38 41 38 
Age: mean (sd)  19.61 (1.73)  20.95 (4.01)  19.61 (2.84) 20.32 (4.19)  
Gender: m/f  20/21 9/29 16/25 15/23  
CES-D: mean 
(sd)  
8.66 (3.84)  27.42 (7.90) 25.95 (7.67)  25.58 (8.52)  
*Standard deviations in parentheses 
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Results  
 Performance was assessed using the proportion of trials on which the optimal 
choice was selected. We first conducted an ANOVA to examine the effect of group (Low 
CES-D control, high CES-D control, low-span, high-span) on performance (Figure 4.4), 
observing a main effect, F(3,154) = 3.138, p = .027, partial-η2 = .058. We directly 
compared the low CES-D and high CES-D groups to determine whether there was a 
deficit associated with depressive symptoms. The group with low CES-D scores selected 
the optimal choice (M = .70) more often than those with high CES-D scores (M = .62), 
t(77) = 2.701, p = .008, Cohen’s d = .616.  The group that completed the high-span 
working memory task performed better on the decision-making task (M = .69) than the 
no-training group t(74) = 2.304, p = .024, Cohen’s d = .536. Those who received the low-
span training (M = .68) also performed better than the no training group, t(77) = 2.026, p 
= .046, Cohen’s d = .462. There were no performance differences between the low CES-
D group, low-span training, and high-span training (ps > .5). As in Experiment 1, we did 
not observe any significant group differences in rates of switching between options, 
streaks of increasing and decreasing option selections, or reaction times after positive and 




Figure 4.4: Chapter 4 Experiment 1 Performance.  
Performance is measured as the proportion of trials on which the optimal choice is 
selected. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
Modeling Results 
 We used the same model analysis from Cooper et al. (2014) and compared the 
relative model fit of the baseline, basic RL and Extended RL models2 (Figure 4.5). The 
Extended RL model was again the best fitting model for all groups. Within the Extended 
RL model, our main parameters of interest were the learning rates for negative reward 
prediction errors and positive reward prediction errors (Figure 4.6). We observed no main 
effect of group within the learning rate for negative prediction errors (p > .9); however, 
we observed a significant main effect of group in learning from positive prediction errors 
F(3,154) = 2.691, p = .048, partial-η2 = .05. The group that completed the high-span 
working memory training procedure was associated with the lowest learning rate (M = 
.24), which was significantly lower than the learning rate for individuals with high CES-
D scores who did not receive training (M = .49), t(74) = 2.962, p = .004, Cohen’s d = 
                                                
2 As Experiment 1 found differences in relative fit of the WSLS model, we also examined whether working 
memory training procedures affected the relative fit of the WSLS model in this task and observed no 























.689. The group that completed the short-span training was fit by a learning rate for 
positive prediction errors (M = .34) that was in between the no training and high-span 
training groups, marginally lower than the no-training group (p = .097), and not 
significantly different from the high-training group (p = .231).   
 
Figure 4.5: Chapter 4 Experiment 2 Modeling Results.  
Akaike weights compare goodness of fit for the baseline model, Basic RL model, and 
Extended RL model. Higher Akaike weights indicate better fit. Error bars represent 





















Figure 4.6: Chapter 4 Experiment 2 Learning Rates.  
Learning rate parameter values for positive and negative reward prediction errors. Error 
bars represent standard error of the mean.  
EXPERIMENT 2 DISCUSSION  
 In Experiment 2 we tested the effect of the working memory task utilized in 
Experiment 1 on the history-independent decision-making task for which attention 
training toward positive stimuli was effective at improving performance in individuals 
with elevated symptoms of depression. We found that engaging working memory, 
whether it was through high or low span lengths, was associated with improvements in 
performance in the history-independent decision-making task.  
 One critical component of reinforcement learning is the ability to integrate reward 
information over time: a component of reinforcement learning that is impaired in 
individuals with depression (Pizzagalli et al., 2008).  Theories of response selection 
propose that the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex utilizes dopaminergic reward prediction 
error signals, integrating recent reinforcements to guide choice behavior (Holroyd and 
Coles, 2002, 2008). Interestingly, this region is also implicated in working memory tasks 

















correlated with the ability to correctly recall letters in the operational span procedure 
(Faraco et al., 2011).     
 The improvements in performance that we observed in our study are potentially 
attributable to lower learning rates indicating that participants were not overly responsive 
to the receipt of a single reward, but successfully utilized the rewards presented over 
several trials to form an understanding of the option that gives the better average reward. 
Future imaging work should examine the neural relationship between the working 
memory task and subsequent history-independent decision-making performance.  
Chapter 4 General Discussion 
 In Chapter 4 we tested the effect of a working memory training procedure on 
subsequent decision-making performance. In these experiments we tested effects in two 
very different decision-making tasks, one that requires participants to observe how 
current selections affect future rewards over time, and one that only requires participants 
to select an option that gives the higher average reward. Perhaps surprisingly, we found 
that performance in both of these tasks was positively impacted by the working-memory 
engaging task.  
 It is important to note that the low-span working memory task was associated 
with better performance in the history-independent task, but not the history-dependent 
task. One possible explanation for this difference is that the history-dependent task could 
be considered more difficult than the history-independent task, if only judging by 
participants’ performance (Chapter 1). Participants in this task learn the optimal strategy 
less quickly than the history-independent task, and perform at a lower level overall. Thus, 
the lower span task may only be successful in attenuating performance deficits in easier 
tasks.  
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 The modeling results of these experiments indicate that the benefit of working 
memory training in the history-dependent task is associated with a shift from the 
utilization of sub-optimal reinforcement learning models to heuristic-based win-stay lose-
shift models. The same shift was not observed in the history-independent task. In this 
case, changes in performance seem to be instead attributable to reduced learning rates.  
Lower learning rates indicate that the participant updates expected value less based on the 
reward prediction error. This decrease in learning rates can also be interpreted as an 
increase in the effect of more distant previous rewards on the current expected value, as 
expected values fluctuate less as rewards are received. It is particularly interesting that we 
observed a change in learning rates for positive prediction errors, but not negative 
prediction errors. This could be due to reward salience—that negative reward prediction 
errors are particularly salient and thus not modified with working memory training. The 
observation of differential effects on learning from positive and negative reward 
prediction errors is not surprising, given their different neural underpinnings. 
Dopaminergic neurons are believed to signal positive and negative reward prediction 
errors differently—with bursts in firing for positive reward prediction errors, and pauses 
for negative prediction errors (e.g. Niv, 2013). Future work should seek to determine the 
specific neural effect of working memory training, focusing on different effects on 
positive and negative reward prediction errors.  
 While the current work utilized neutral stimuli in our working memory procedure 
(i.e. letters), future work may benefit from the use of appropriate affective stimuli 
(emotional words and/or faces) in working memory training, which has been shown to 
improve affective control and emotion regulation (Schweizer, Hampshire, & Dalgleish, 
2011; Schweizer et al., 2013). It is possible that incorporating affective stimuli will 
influence our effects.  
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 We referred to the working memory task as a training paradigm; however, it is not 
training in the traditional sense that includes a goal of improving a skill. Our goal for the 
working memory paradigm was to encourage the use of cognitive resources in a 
subsequent task. As such, a description of “working memory priming” or “working 
memory induction” might have been more appropriate, but these descriptions also have 
associations that do not align with the goals of the current study. In the current work we 
did not expect to induce long-term improvements in working memory, and we could 
therefore only expect our effects to be short-lived. Future work would benefit from 
longer-term training mechanisms that do enhance working memory to determine whether 
effects in performance can be attributed to increased working memory or short-lived 
strategy modification. While decision-making performance was higher after one session 
of this working memory task, it is likely that long-term training could increase working 
memory capacity, further increasing cognitive performance.  
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Chapter 5: Long Term Training and Decision-Making 
 In Chapter 5 we present the preliminary findings from a long-term working 
memory training procedure on both history-dependent and history-independent decision-
making. In Chapter 4 we established that the engagement of working memory through the 
completion of a difficult operational span task led to better performance in subsequent 
decision-making tasks. While it is exciting that we can produce changes in a single-
session procedure, these benefits only last for a short period of time, and ultimately we 
would like to produce longer-lasting improvements in cognition. The goal of this study is 
to determine whether longer periods of training can lead to more persistent improvements 
in performance, and whether the valence of training stimuli affects performance in 
reward-based decision-making.    
 Previous work in working memory training with emotional material found that 
training led to transfer gains in other working memory tasks, but also produced gains in 
cognitive control over affective information on an emotional Stroop task (Schweizer et 
al., 2011). Training with emotional material also led to enhanced efficiency of fronto-
parietal neural circuitry and enhanced emotion regulation (Schweizer et al., 2013). 
Incorporating positive stimuli into working memory training may strengthen the efficacy 
of training in tasks that require the processing of emotional information. Additionally, we 
may see an additional effect of valence in decision-making tasks in which positive 
rewards must be processed and remembered for optimal performance. 
 We hypothesized that working memory training would improve performance in 
both the history-dependent decision-making task and the history-independent decision-
making task, consistent with the findings of Chapter 4. We also hypothesized that long-
span training with positive stimuli would show the greatest effect in the history-
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independent task. We made these predictions based on the combined results of Chapters 3 
and 4—hypothesizing that remembering positive words may have a similar effect to 
attention training on those who depend on reflexive processing, and those who depend on 




 Participants were recruited from the University of Texas at Austin. Participants 
were invited to participate in our study if their CES-D score was above or equal to the 
cutoff of 16, BDI-short score above or equal to 7, and if their performance was below the 
40th percentile on the history-dependent decision-making task (based on previously 
collected samples). Seventy-five participants began the study, with 45 individuals 
participating to completion. Participants were compensated $8 per hour with a $2 per 
hour bonus for completing the experiment.  





CES-D End Gender Completion 
Time (Days) 
Long Neutral 12 26.4 (11.3) 23.9 (9.2)  9 F/ 3 M  47.3 (9.8) 
Long Positive 11 30.1 (7.6) 28.2 (11.2)  9 F/ 2 M  45.2 (11.1) 
Short Neutral  9 27.8 (14.3) 25.1 (12.3)  7 F / 2 M  50.2 (12.0) 
Short Positive 13 32.0 (9.4)  32.2 (14.0)  9 F / 4 M 53.1 (10.3)  
*Standard deviations in parentheses 
Procedure 
 Participants were assigned to one of four working-memory training conditions. 
Participants were stratified by gender to obtain similar proportions of male and female 
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participants in each group. The training paradigm consisted of short and long versions of 
the Operational Span task (similar to Chapter 4) over the course of 20 sessions.  The 
working memory task was modified so that the to-be-remembered stimuli consisted of 
either positive or neutral words. For the short versions, participants were asked to 
remember spans of 3-4 words interleaved with math problems, while in the long 
condition participants were asked to remember spans of 6-7 words, Figure 5.1.  
 Two sets of words were used in this set of data. All words were selected from the 
database of Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999). The 
first set was matched on first letter, length, arousal, and frequency of use from the Corpus 
of Contemporary American English (Davies, 2008), Table 5.2. The second set of positive 
and neutral words was additionally matched on concreteness from the MRC 
Psycholinguistics Database (Wilson, 1988), Table 5.3.  
 
Table 5.2: Long-term training stimuli set 1.  
Neutral Set 1  
  Valence Arousal Freq Length  
Application 4.69 5.62 16261 11.00 
Cowboy  6.48 5.75 5127 7.00 
Embark 6.47 5.83 951 6.00 
Future 6.71 6.48 99552 6.00 
Game 6.98 5.89 112175 4.00 
Hire 5.77 5.63 9941 4.00 
Interest 6.97 5.66 76043 8.00 
Lava 4.43 5.57 2230 4.00 
Pierce 4.35 5.81 3976 6.00 
Recipe 6.70 5.60 9950 6.00 
Skyscraper 5.88 5.71 645 10.00 
Theater 6.69 5.86 24767 7.00 
Average 6.01 5.78 30134.8 6.58 
STDev 0.99 0.24 41013.4 2.23 
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Positive Set 1  
  Valence Arousal Freq Length  
Achievement 7.89 5.53 18432 11.00 
Comedy 8.37 5.85 10206 6.00 
Elated 7.45 6.21 755 6.00 
Friend 7.74 5.74 72248 6.00 
Glad 7.77 5.70 17817 4.00 
Hero 7.59 6.41 13774 4.00 
Inspired 7.15 6.02 13623 8.00 
Love 8.72 6.44 152358 4.00 
Pretty 7.75 6.03 74017 6.00 
Riches 7.70 6.17 1743 6.00 
Sweetheart 8.42 5.50 2753 10.00 
Triumph 7.80 5.78 5526 7.00 
Average 7.86 5.95 31937.7 6.50 
STDev 0.44 0.32 45576.6 2.24 
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Table 5.3: Long-term training stimuli set 2. 
Neutral Set 2 
  Valence Arousal Freq Length  Concreteness 
Avenue 5.50 4.12 17263 6.00 539.00 
Chance 6.02 5.38 60050 6.00 254.00 
Errand 4.58 3.85 759 6.00 411.00 
Gender 5.73 4.38 24441 6.00 408.00 
Humble 5.86 3.74 4326 6.00 231.00 
Industry 5.30 4.47 69208 8.00 479.00 
Lightning 4.57 6.61 6724 9.00 525.00 
Patient 5.29 4.21 36137 7.00 487.00 
Rough 4.74 5.33 13748 5.00 452.00 
Salute 5.92 5.31 2085 6.00 471.00 
Theory 5.30 4.62 41090 6.00 287.00 
Wonder 6.03 5.00 32538 6.00 305.00 
Average 5.40 4.75 25697.4 6.42 404.08 
STDev 0.54 0.82 22719.0 1.08 107.94 
Positive Set 2 
  Valence Arousal Freq Length  Concreteness 
Angel 7.53 4.83 8988 5.00 399.00 
Comfort 7.07 3.93 14886 8.00 402.00 
Elegant 7.43 4.53 8028 7.00 309.00 
Gentle 7.31 3.21 8839 6.00 322.00 
Humor 8.56 5.50 11236 5.00 601.00 
Intimate 7.61 6.98 7842 8.00 281.00 
Laughter 8.45 6.75 13262 8.00 411.00 
Peace 7.72 2.95 47264 5.00 309.00 
Reward 7.53 4.95 7338 6.00 396.00 
Spring 7.76 5.67 45390 6.00 524.00 
Truth 7.80 5.00 48466 5.00 261.00 
Wedding 7.82 5.97 17340 7.00 509.00 
Average 7.72 5.02 19906.6 6.33 393.67 
STDev 0.43 1.26 16654.0 1.23 105.94 
 
The experiment consisted of a pre-test assessment, training period, and post-test 
assessment. During the pre-test assessment, all participants completed a battery of 
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questionnaires that included the CES-D (Radloff, 1977). During the pre-test, participants 
completed 150 trials of a history-dependent decision-making task with either paint or 
martian oxygen surface features. Participants also completed 150 trials of the history-
independent decision-making task from Chapter 1. Other cognitive tasks and 
questionnaires, not discussed in this dissertation, were included in this study to assess 
memory and executive functioning.  
Training consisted of 20 sessions3 of the Ospan procedure (Figure 5.1). This 
procedure was identical to the procedure utilized in Chapter 4, with the exception that 
participants had to remember words instead of letters. Sample screen shots of the word 
recall portion of the experiment can be seen in Figure 5.2. The training procedure was 
presented in Python 2.7. The program was installed on each participant’s laptop. 
Participants who did not have access to a laptop computer or who did not wish to have 
programs installed on their computer were loaned a lab computer for the duration of the 
experiment.  
After completing their training sessions, participants returned to the lab for their 
post-test assessments. The post-test was identical to the pre-test, with the exception that 
surface features from the pre-test were counterbalanced with the post-test so that 
participants did not receive the same surface feature twice.  
                                                
3 Due to experimenter and computer error, some participants only completed 19 sessions.  
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Figure 5.1: Long-Term Training Procedure.  




Figure 5.2: Long-Term Training Stimuli.  
The operational span procedure was modified so that participants remembered words 
instead of letters.  
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RESULTS 
History-Dependent Task  
We examined performance in the history-dependent task by assessing the change 
in the number of points collected for each participant (post test – pre test). Positive values 
of this measure indicate that the participant improved their performance (Figure 5.3). 
Four participants’ data (one in each condition) were excluded from this analysis for 
“button mashing”—selecting the same option on 99-100% of trials.  
 
Figure 5.3: Chapter 5 History-Dependent Results.  
Change in performance is measured by subtracting pre-test total performance from post-


















The only condition that showed an average positive improvement was the Long-
Neutral group, however, this difference was not significantly different from zero using a 
one-sample t-test (p = .413).  
 History-Independent Task  
We examined performance in the history-independent task by assessing the 
change in the number of points collected for each participant (post test – pre test). 
Positive values of this measure indicate that the participant improved their performance 
(Figure 5.4). Three participants were excluded from this analysis for selecting the same 
option on ≥ 99% of trials. 
 
Figure 5.4: Chapter 5 History-Independent Results.  
Change in performance is measured by subtracting pre-test total performance from post-


















The largest numerical improvement was observed in the Long Neutral condition, 
in which participants improved by an average of 189 points, followed by the Long 
Positive Condition (M = 178), Short Positive (M = 104) and Short Neutral (M = 85).  
These improvements were not significantly different from zero for individual groups (ps 
> .14), however, improvements were observed when collapsed across all participants who 
completed the Long-Span training conditions t(13) = 2.281, p = .040, Cohen’s d = 1.265.  
Training Performance  
We analyzed performance in the memory portion of the operational span training 
procedure, as well as average reaction times for each session4 (Figure 5.5). Performance 
did not change across sessions (p = .827), and session did not interact with condition (p = 
.999). We did observe a main effect of condition, F(3, 655) = 16.220, p < .001. Average 
performance was higher in the short-span conditions (M = .92) than the long-span 
conditions (M = .88), t(734) = 5.564, p < .001.  
Reaction times showed a main effect of condition F(3, 660) = 3.744, p = .011, as 
well as a main effect of session, F(19, 660) = 3.533, p < .001. Reaction times were 
significantly higher in the first session than the last session, t(75) = 6.663, p < .001. 
Reaction times were also higher in the long-span training conditions than the short-span 
conditions, t(734) = 2.933, p = .003.  
                                                
4 For these analyses, we excluded reaction times on any response that took longer than 3.5 seconds, and 
sessions where performance was less than 50%, as we believed that values beyond these thresholds 
indicated that participants were not dedicating their full attention to the task.  
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Figure 5.5: Training Performance.  
Left: Accuracy in operational span memory trials. Right: Reaction times in training 
sessions. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
Correlations 
We examined correlations between improvements in the history-independent task, 
the history-dependent task, change in CES-D score, starting and ending CES-D scores, 
working memory training performance and response times5, and time to completion. 
Improvements in the history-independent task were correlated with improvements in the 
history-dependent task, r(22) = .437, p = .037. Improvements in performance were not 
correlated with any other variables for either task.  
CES-D Scores 
Scores on the Center for Epidemiological Studies—Depression Scale (Radloff, 
1977) were collected to measure the severity of depression symptoms. These scores were 
collected at the pre-test and post-test. We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA to 
                                                
5 Training performance measures included performance in each of the first and last recorded sessions and 
the difference between these sessions. Two participants did not have working memory data due to 








































determine whether CES-D scores differed across groups, whether they changed across 
time, and whether condition had a different effect on CES-D scores (time x group 
interaction). Neither the main effects (p < .187) nor the interaction were significant (p = 
.843).  
  
Figure 5.6: CES-D Scores.  
CES-D Scores for each group, pre- and post- working memory training. Errors bars 
represent standard error of the mean.  
Attrition Analysis  
We experienced significant rates of participant dropout in this study. The 
completion rate was 60%. We are interested in identifying differences between those who 
completed the study and those who dropped out. In line with this interest, we analyzed 
initial CES-D scores, gender, and initial decision-making performance to determine 
whether differences existed between the two groups. The participants who did not 
















completed the study (M = 29.2), t(72) = 1.687, p = .096. Female participants were more 
likely to finish the study—68% of female participants finished the study, while only 44% 
of male participant who began the study completed it. The participants who did not 
complete the study also performed significantly worse on the history-dependent decision-
making task t(71) = 2.652, p = .010 (Mcompleted = 9136, MDropout = 8200). 
The difference in decision-making performance between those who dropped out 
and those who completed the study is particularly interesting. It is possible that those who 
dropped out would have shown the most benefit from the training. Thus, high dropout 
rates of individuals with poor history-dependent decision-making performance may have 
masked potential training effects.   
CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION 
In this experiment we tested the effects of longer-term working memory training. 
Individuals with self-reported symptoms of depression, as assessed by the CES-D and 
BDI, completed 20 sessions of a working memory training procedure. We assessed 
changes in decision-making performance in two tasks: a history-dependent task for which 
future rewards depended on previous choice history, and a history-independent task for 
which rewards only depended on the current selection.  
Our preliminary results suggest that performance in the history-independent 
decision-making task is positively affected by long-span working memory training, with 
little difference emerging between the positive and neutral training conditions. We also 
found minimal changes in performance in the history-dependent task in any condition, 
although this lack of effect may be attributable to the subset of participants who did not 
complete the training study. The only positive change, though non-significant, was 
observed in individuals who completed the long-span procedure with neutral stimuli. 
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Together, these results suggest that the long-span neutral stimuli condition has the 
greatest promise for improving decision-making performance across tasks.  
Analyses of performance measures and reaction times in the training procedure 
indicate that participants did not significantly improve their performance in the task, but 
did improve their reaction times. The lack of improvement in performance may be due to 
high levels of performance of many participants, even in the difficult condition. Future 
studies using these types of training procedures would benefit from the use of an adaptive 
training paradigm that increases the span length as participants improve. Additionally, 
interleaving the operational span procedure with other working memory training tasks 
such as n-back or digit span tasks may be more effective at keeping participants engaged 
and reducing attrition.  
The greatest challenge in this study that should be considered in future work is the 
significant rate of participant dropout, which limited our sample size and prevented us 
from drawing strong conclusions. Future work should seek methods of improving 
retention, such as increased compensation or increased completion bonus. Changes in 
recruitment methods may also improve retention rates. Specifically, many of our 
participants were students. It is possible that the variable schedule of college courses and 
exams interfered with their training schedules. Recruiting a sample from the community 
may allow for more stable schedules and increased completion rates. Future studies may 
also benefit from performance bonuses for individual pre- and post- test measurements to 
increase participant engagement. Work with a larger sample could provide insights 
regarding the mechanism underlying improvements in these tasks, and could help identify 
specific characteristics that determine the individuals who will show the greatest 
improvements from working memory training.   
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Final Remarks and Future Directions 
Under the dual-systems theory of learning, at least two different learning systems 
have been identified through which learning may be moderated: a reflective hypothesis-
testing system, and a reflexive reinforcement learning system (e.g. Ashby & Alfonso-
Reese, 1998). In this body of work we examined performance in tasks that are optimally 
mediated by both systems, including within-subject performance between the tasks, 
stability across time, effects of individual differences on task performance, and 
malleability of performance with targeted training measures.  
Our findings in Chapters 1 and 2 indicate that performance in reflective and 
reflexive tasks is related, but not deterministic. When participants are free to engage any 
strategy, participants often utilize heuristic-based strategies in these tasks, while they 
shift to reflexive strategies under cognitive load. Individuals who perform poorly in 
reflexive decision-making tasks do not necessarily perform poorly in reflective decision-
making tasks, yet they show a propensity to engage similar strategies. It is perhaps 
surprising that deficits in both tasks are associated with depression symptoms when 
performance in the two tasks is not positively correlated. This is likely attributable to the 
heterogeneity of depression—that a single disorder category contains members with 
different symptoms, etiological pathways, and comorbid conditions (Treadway & Zald, 
2011). It is therefore likely that the deficits that we observe in these unique tasks are due 
to different underlying causes. With this in mind, future work should seek to assess 
changes within an individual, and to determine whether specific traits can predict deficits 
in either task or responsiveness to methods of improving decision-making performance.  
Our findings highlight the importance of developing training mechanisms that are 
aligned with the underlying processes that are necessary for optimal task performance. 
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We found that modifying attention toward positive stimuli affected performance in 
reflexive tasks, while it was ineffective at attenuating reflective reward processing 
deficits. Alternately, engaging working memory through an operational span procedure 
affected performance in both reflexive and reflective decision-making tasks, with 
computational models supporting different mechanisms of this effect.  The results of the 
current study, combined with our previous work, lead us to believe that deficits can be 
attenuated through methods that target the underlying source of the deficit. We would 
hypothesize that attentional training methods would likewise affect implicit, habitual 
processes, while working memory training methods would affect other reflective 
processes.  
The effect of working memory training on the history-independent decision-
making task is particularly interesting. If the history-independent task is considered to be 
an entirely reflexive task, then our findings do not align with the dual systems 
framework. This discrepancy highlights the difference between the decision-making tasks 
and the tasks used in the category learning literature. In our history-independent task, 
decent performance can still be attained using rules and heuristic-based processes, 
whereas these processes lead to poor performance in implicit category learning tasks. The 
critical aspect in classifying the history-independent task as reflexive is that good 
performance can be achieved using reflexive strategies. At this point, it is unclear 
whether the positive effects of working memory training on history-independent 
decision-making were from enhancements in reflective processing, or from enhancements 
in the memory components of reflexive processes (e.g. remembering expected values). 
This difference can be further teased apart in future work by examining effects of 
working memory training on history-independent decision-making under dual task 
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conditions that force participants to utilize reflexive strategies. If improvements are still 
observed, we should reconsider the importance of memory in reflexive tasks.  
Overall, this body of work demonstrates that decision-making performance is 
malleable. In Chapters 3 and 4 we found performance differences between groups simply 
by ordering tasks in a manner than encouraged the use of optimal strategies through 
carry-over effects. We hypothesize that the attention and working memory training 
procedures used in Chapters 3 and 4 worked through a priming mechanism that 
encouraged participants to engage different strategies. In Chapter 5 we found that long 
term working memory training did not improve history-dependent decision-making 
performance. We see two clear possibilities for this outcome. One possibility is that 
decision-making performance in this task is not dependent on working memory capacity, 
but dependent on strategy engagement that is affected by the activities that immediately 
precede the task (i.e. affected by priming, but not long-term training). The other 
possibility is that the effects of long-term training on the history-dependent task were 
masked by our high attrition rate, particularly of participants who performed poorly in the 
history-dependent task and who showed more potential for improvement.     
It should also be noted that variability in task performance arises in individuals 
without depressive symptoms that cannot be attributed to depression. Future studies 
should evaluate the effect of these training mechanisms on individuals with normative 
emotion processing but poor reflective processing. We would expect that individuals 
without symptoms of depression, but with poor decision-making performance, could 
benefit from these paradigms.  
Finally, it is important to note that our study population throughout these 
experiments consisted of undergraduate students with high self-reported symptoms of 
depression. It is unlikely that many of our participants would meet the criteria for major 
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depression, limiting the generalization of our findings to clinical populations. While it is 
possible that findings would be more pronounced in clinically depressed populations, it is 
also possible that deficits associated with reward-processing would be blunted due to 
anti-depressant medications (e.g. Eshel & Roiser, 2010). Future studies would benefit 
immensely from the consideration of neural mechanisms that underlie these deficits, 
effects of medication, and advanced computational models to further understand the 
effects of training mechanisms on cognitive processing.  
Throughout this series of studies, we find that decision-making performance 
between history-dependent and history-independent decision-making tasks is related and 
relatively stable, and that individuals depend on similar strategies in different tasks, 
particularly during early trials. We also find that high self-reported symptoms of 
depression are associated with poorer performance in both of these tasks. Importantly, 
these studies show that decision-making performance is malleable, and is affected by 
both attention-training mechanisms and working memory training. Our final experiment 
indicates that long-term working training has the potential to improve decision-making 
performance. In particular, long-span training with neutral stimuli showed the most 
promise. Future studies using this type of training would be useful in determining the 
extent of these benefits, and whether they extend to other types of cognitive tasks.  




Akaike, H. (1974). A new look at the statistical model identification. IEEE Transactions 
on Automatic Control, 19(6), 716–723. 
Ahn, W. Y., Busemeyer, J. R., Wagenmakers, E. J., & Stout, J. C. (2008). Comparison of 
decision learning models using the generalization criterion method. Cognitive 
Science, 32(8), 1376-1402. 
Ashby, F. G., & Alfonso-Reese, L. A. (1998). A neuropsychological theory of multiple 
systems in category learning. Psychological review, 105(3), 442. 
Ashby, F. G., & Maddox, W. T. (2005). Human category learning. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 56, 149–178. 
Ashby, F. G., and Maddox, W. T. (2011). Human category learning 2.0. Annals of the 
New York Academy of Sciences, 1224, 147–161.  
Ashby, F. G., and O’Brien, J. B. (2005). Category learning and multiple memory 
systems. Trends in Cognitive Science. 9, 83–89.  
Beck, A. T. (1976). Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. Oxford, UK: 
International Universities Press. 
Beck, A. T., & Steer, R. A. (1993). Beck Depression Inventory: Manual. San Antonio, 
TX: The Psychological Corporation. 
Beekman, A. T. F., Deeg, D. J. H., Limbeek, J., Braam, A. W., De Vries, M. Z., & 
Tilburg, W. (1997). Criterion validity of the Center for Epidemiologic Studies 
Depression scale (CES-D): results from a community-based sample of older subjects 
in the Netherlands. Psychological Medicine, 27(1), 231–235. 
Beevers, C. G., Worthy, D. A., Gorlick, M. A., Nix, B., Chotibut, T., & Maddox, W. T. 
(2013). Influence of depression symptoms on history-independent reward and 
punishment processing. Psychiatry Research, 207(1), 53–60.  
Berridge, K. C., & Robinson, T. E. (2003). Parsing reward. Trends in neurosciences, 
26(9), 507–513.  
Blanco, N. J., Otto, A. R., Maddox, W. T., Beevers, C. G., & Love, B. C. (2013). The 
influence of depression symptoms on exploratory decision-making. Cognition, 
129(3), 563–568.  
Bradley, B. P., Mogg, K., & Lee, S. C. (1997). Attentional biases for negative 
information in induced and naturally occurring dysphoria. Behaviour research and 
therapy, 35(10), 911–927.  
Bradley, M.M., & Lang, P.J. (1999). Affective norms for English words (ANEW): 
Stimuli, instruction manual and affective ratings. Technical report C-1, Gainesville, 
FL. The Center for Research in Psychophysiology, University of Florida. 
Brainard, D. H. (1997). The psychophysics toolbox. Spatial vision, 10(4), 433–436. 
Burt, D. B., Zembar, M. J., & Niederehe, G. (1995). Depression and memory impairment: 
A meta-analysis of the association, its pattern, and specificity. Psychological bulletin, 
117(2), 285–305.  
Busemeyer, J. R., Wang, Y. M.  (2000). Model comparisons and model selections based 
 97 
on generalization criterion methodology. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 44, 
171–189. 
Butters, M. A., Bhalla, R. K., Mulsant, B. H., Mazumdar, S., Houck, P. R., Begley, A. E., 
et al. (2004). Executive Functioning, Illness Course, and Relapse/Recurrence in 
Continuation and Maintenance Treatment of Late-Life Depression. The American 
Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 12(4), 387–394.  
Chandrasekaran, B.,Yi, H-G. & Maddox, W.T. (2014). Dual-learning systems during 
speech category learning. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 21, 488-495.  
Chein, J. M., & Morrison, A. B. (2010). Expanding the mind’s workspace: Training and 
transfer effects with a complex working memory span task. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 17(2), 193–199.  
Christopher, G., & MacDonald, J. (2005). The impact of clinical depression on working 
memory. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 10(5), 379–399.  
Cleeremans, A. & Dienes, Z. (2008).Computational Models of Implicit Learning 
In Sun, R. (Ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Computational Modeling,Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 396-421. 
Cooper, J.A., Gorlick, M.A., Denny, T., Worthy, D.A., Beevers, C.G., & Maddox, W.T. 
(2014). Training attention improves decision-making in individuals with elevated 
self-reported depressive symptoms. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 14(2), 729-741. 
Cooper, J. A., Worthy, D. A., Gorlick, M. A., & Maddox, W. T. (2013). Scaffolding 
across the lifespan in history-dependent decision-making. Psychology and Aging, 
28(2), 505–514.  
Davies, M. (2008). The Corpus of Contemporary American English: 520 million words, 
1990-present. Available online at http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/. 
Daw, N. D., Niv, Y., & Dayan, P. (2005). Uncertainty-based competition between 
prefrontal and dorsolateral striatal systems for behavioral control. Nature 
neuroscience, 8, 1704–1711.  
DeCaro, M. S., Thomas, R. D., and Beilock, S. L. (2008). Individual differences in 
category learning: sometimes less working memory capacity is better than more. 
Cognition, 107, 284–294. 
Denburg, N. L., Tranel, D., & Bechara, A. (2005). The ability to decide advantageously 
declines prematurely in some normal older persons. Neuropsychologia, 43, 1099- 
1106. 
Doll, B. B., Jacobs, W. J., Sanfey, A. G., & Frank, M. J. (2009). Instructional control of 
reinforcement learning: A behavioral and neurocomputational investigation. Brain 
research, 1299, 74–94.  
Doya, K., Samejima, K., Katagiri, K., and Kawato, M. (2002). Multiple model based 
reinforcement learning. Neural Computation. 14, 1347–1369. 
Elderkin-Thompson, V., Mintz, J., Haroon, E., Lavretsky, H., & Kumar, A. (2006). 
Executive dysfunction and memory in older patients with major and minor 
depression. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 21, 669–676. 
Ellis, A. J., Beevers, C. G., & Wells, T. T. (2011). Attention Allocation and Incidental 
 98 
Recognition of Emotional Information in Dysphoria. Cognitive therapy and research, 
35(5), 425–433.  
Eshel, N., & Roiser, J. P. (2010). Reward and Punishment Processing in Depression. 
Biological psychiatry, 68(2), 118–124. 
 
 
Faraco, C. C., Unsworth, N., Langley, J., Terry, D., Li, K., Zhang, D., ... & Miller, L. S. 
(2011). Complex span tasks and hippocampal recruitment during working 
memory. NeuroImage, 55(2), 773-787. 
Frank, M. J., Doll, B. B., Oas-Terpstra, J., & Moreno, F. (2009). Prefrontal and striatal 
dopaminergic genes predict individual differences in exploration and exploitation. 
Nature neuroscience, 12(8), 1062–1068.  
Glascher, J., Daw, N., Dayan, P., O’Doherty, J. P. (2010). States versus rewards: 
Dissociable neural prediction error signals underlying model-based and model-free 
reinforcement learning. Neuron, 66, 585-595. 
Gotlib, I. H., & Krasnoperova, E. (1998). Biased information processing as a 
vulnerability factor for depression. Behavior Therapy, 29(4), 603–617.  
Gureckis, T. M., & Love, B. C. (2009). Short-term gains, long-term pains: how cues 
about state aid learning in dynamic environments. Cognition, 113(3), 293–313.  
Hakamata, Y., Lissek, S., Bar-Haim, Y., Britton, J. C., Fox, N. A., Leibenluft, E., et al. 
(2010). Attention bias modification treatment: a meta-analysis toward the 
establishment of novel treatment for anxiety. Biological Psychiatry, 68(11), 982–990.  
Hallion, L. S., & Ruscio, A. M. (2011). A meta-analysis of the effect of cognitive bias 
modification on anxiety and depression. Psychological Bulletin. 137(6):940-58  
Hartlage, S., Alloy, L. B., Vázquez, C., & Dykman, B. (1993). Automatic and effortful 
processing in depression. Psychological bulletin, 113(2), 247–278.  
Harrison, T. L., Shipstead, Z., Hicks, K. L., Hambrick, D. Z., Redick, T. S., & Engle, R. 
W. (2013). Working Memory Training May Increase Working Memory Capacity but 
Not Fluid Intelligence. Psychological Science.   
Henik, A. & Tzelgov, J. (1982). Is three greater than five: The relation between physical 
and semantic size in comparison tasks. Memory & Cognition 10, 389-395.  
Hertel, P. T. (1994). Depression and memory: Are impairments remediable through 
attentional control? Current Directions in Psychological Science, 3(6), 190–193. 
Holroyd, C. B., & Coles, M. G. (2002). The neural basis of human error processing: 
reinforcement learning, dopamine, and the error-related negativity. Psychological 
review, 109(4), 679. 
Holroyd, C. B., & Coles, M. G. (2008). Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex integrates 
reinforcement history to guide voluntary behavior. Cortex, 44(5), 548-559. 
Jaeggi, S. M., Buschkuehl, M., Jonides, J., & Perrig, W. J. (2008). Improving fluid 
intelligence with training on working memory, Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences of the United States of America. 105(19), 6829–6833.  
Joorman, J., & Gotlib, I. H. (2008). Updating the contents of working memory in 
depression: Interference from irrelevant negative material. Journal of Abnormal 
 99 
Psychology, 117(1), 182-192.  
Kessler, R. C., & Walters, E. E. (1998). Epidemiology of DSM-III-R major depression 
and minor depression among adolescents and young adults in the national 
comorbidity survey. Depression and anxiety, 7(1), 3–14.  
 
 
Kessler, R. C., Berglund, P., Demler, O., Jin, R., Koretz, D., Merikangas, K. R., et al. 
(2003). The Epidemiology of Major Depressive Disorder: Results From the National 
Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R). Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 289(23), 3095–3105.  
Knowlton. (1999). What can neuropsychology tell us about category learning? Trends in 
cognitive sciences, 3(4), 123–124. 
Knox, W. B., Otto, A. R., Stone, P., & Love, B. C. (2012). The nature of belief-directed 
exploratory choice in human decision-making. Frontiers in Cognitive Science, 2, 
398.  
Kruschke, J. K. (2008). Bayesian approaches to associative learning: From passive to 
active learning. Learning & Behavior, 36(3), 210–226.  
Kuhnen, C. M., & Knutson, B. (2005). The neural basis of financial risk-taking. Neuron, 
47, 763-770. 
Kunisato, Y., Okamoto, Y., Ueda, K., Onoda, K., Okada, G., Yoshimura, S., et al. (2012). 
Effects of depression on reward-based decision-making and variability of action in 
probabilistic learning. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 
43(4), 1088–1094.  
MacLeod, C., Mathews, A., & Tata, P. (1986). Attentional bias in emotional disorders. 
Journal of abnormal psychology, 95(1), 15–20.  
Macleod, C., Rutherford, E., Campbell, L., Ebsworthy, G., & Holker, L. (2002). Selective 
attention and emotional vulnerability: Assessing the causal basis of their association 
through the experimental manipulation of attentional bias. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 111(1), 107–123.  
Maddox, W. T. & Ashby, F.G. (2004). Dissociating explicit and procedural learning 
based systems of perceptual category learning. Behavioural Processes, 66, 309-322.  
Maddox, W. T., Gorlick, M. A., Worthy, D. A., & Beevers, C. G. (2012). Depressive 
symptoms enhance loss-minimization, but attenuate gain-maximization in history-
dependent decision-making. Cognition, 125, 118–124. 
Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (2005). Cognitive vulnerability to emotional disorders. 
Annual review of clinical psychology, 1, 167–195. 
Miles, S. J., & Minda, J. P. (2011). The effects of concurrent verbal and visual tasks on 
category learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 37(3), 588. 
Mogg, K., & Bradley, B. P. (2005). Attentional Bias in Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
Versus Depressive Disorder. Cognitive therapy and research, 29(1), 29–45.  
Nassar, M. R., Wilson, R. C., Heasly, B., & Gold, J. I. (2010). An Approximately 
Bayesian Delta-Rule Model Explains the Dynamics of Belief Updating in a Changing 
 100 
Environment. The Journal of Neuroscience, 30(37), 12366–12378.  
Niv, Y. (2013). Neuroscience: Dopamine ramps up. Nature, 500(7464), 533-535 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2000). The role of rumination in depressive disorders and mixed 
anxiety/depressive symptoms. Journal of abnormal psychology, 109(3), 504–511.  
Nomura, E. M., Maddox, W. T., Filoteo, J. V., Ing, A. D., Gitelman, D. R., Parrish, T. B., 
et al. (2007). Neural correlates of rule-based and information-integration visual 
category learning. Cerebral. Cortex 17, 37–43.  
Otto, A. R., Taylor, E. G., &Markman, A. B. (2011). There are at least two kinds of 
probability matching: evidence from a secondary task. Cognition, 118, 274-279.  
Paul, E. J., & Ashby, F. G. (2015). A neurocomputational theory of how explicit learning 
bootstraps early procedural learning. Basal ganglia: physiological, behavioral, and 
computational studies. 
Pelli, D. G. (1997). The VideoToolbox software for visual psychophysics: Transforming 
numbers into movies. Spatial vision, 10(4), 437–422. 
Pizzagalli, D. A., Holmes, A. J., Dillon, D. G., Goetz, E. L., Birk, J. L., Bogdan, R., et al. 
(2009). Reduced Caudate and Nucleus Accumbens Response to Rewards in 
Unmedicated Individuals With Major Depressive Disorder. American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 166(6), 702–710.  
Pizzagalli, D. A., Iosifescu, D., Hallett, L. A., Ratner, K. G., & Fava, M. (2008). Reduced 
hedonic capacity in major depressive disorder: Evidence from a probabilistic reward 
task. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 43(1), 76–87.  
Poldrack, R. A., & Packard, M. G. (2003). Competition among multiple memory 
systems: converging evidence from animal and human brain studies. 
Neuropsychologia, 41(3), 245–251. 
Radloff, L. S. (1977). The CES-D scale a self-report depression scale for research in the 
general population. Applied psychological measurement, 1(3), 385–401. 
Ridderinkhof, K. R., & van den Wildenberg, W. (2004). Neurocognitive mechanisms of 
cognitive control: the role of prefrontal cortex in action selection, response inhibition, 
performance monitoring, and reward-based learning. Brain and Cognition, 56(2), 
129–140. 
Rogers, M. A., Kasai, K., Koji, M., Fukuda, R., Iwanami, A., Nakagome, K., et al. 
(2004). Executive and prefrontal dysfunction in unipolar depression: a review of 
neuropsychological and imaging evidence. Neuroscience Research, 50(1), 1–11.  
Samanez-Larkin, G. R., Gibbs, S. E. B., Khanna, K., Nielsen, L., Carstensen, L. L., & 
Knutson, B. (2007). Anticipation of monetary gain bus not loss in healthy older 
adults. Nature Neuroscience, 10, 787-791. 
Samanez-Larkin, G. R., Kuhnen, C. K., Yoo, D. J., & Knutson, B. (2010). Variability in 
nucleus accumbens activity mediates age-related suboptimal financial risk-taking. 
The Journal of Neuroscience, 30, 1426-1434. 
Schweizer, S., Hampshire, A., Dalgleish, T. (2011) Extending Brain-Training to the 
Affective Domain: Increasing Cognitive and Affective Executive Control through 
Emotional Working Memory Training. PLoS ONE, 6(9): e24372.  
Schweizer, S., Grahn, J., Hampshire, A., Mobbs, D., Dalgleish, T. (2013). Training the 
 101 
Emotional Brain: Improving Affective Control through Emotional Working Memory 
Training. The Journal of Neuroscience, 33(12), 301-5311. 
Sears, C. R., Thomas, C. L., LeHuquet, J. M., & Johnson, J. C. S. (2010). Attentional 
biases in dysphoria: An eye-tracking study of the allocation and disengagement of 
attention. Cognition & Emotion, 24(8), 1349–1368. 
Seger, C. A. (2008). How do the basal ganglia contribute to categorization? Their roles in 
generalization, response selection, and learning via feedback. Neurosci. Biobehav. 
Rev. 32, 265–278.  
Seger, C. A., and Cincotta, C. M. (2005). The roles of the caudate nucleus in human 
classification learning. J. Neurosci. 25, 2941–2951. 
Seger, C. A., and Miller, E. K. (2010). Category learning in the brain. Annual Review 
Neuroscience. 33, 203–219.  
Steyvers, M., Lee, M. D., & Wagenmakers, E. J. (2009). A Bayesian analysis of human 
decision-making on bandit problems. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 53(3), 
168–179. 
Stroop, R. J. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 18, 643-66. 
Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (1998). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Teasdale, J. D. (1988). Cognitive Vulnerability to Persistent Depression. Cognition & 
Emotion, 2(3), 247–274. 
Treadway, M. T., & Zald, D. H. (2011). Reconsidering anhedonia in depression: lessons 
from translational neuroscience. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 35(3), 537-
555. 
Unsworth, N., Heitz, R. P., Schrock, J. C., & Engle, R. W. (2005). An automated version 
of the operation span task. Behavior research methods, 37(3), 498–505.  
Wadlinger, H. A., & Isaacowitz, D. M. (2008). Looking happy: the experimental 
manipulation of a positive visual attention bias. Emotion, 8(1), 121–126.  
Wagenmakers, E.-J., & Farrell, S. (2004). AIC model selection using Akaike weights. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11(1), 192–196.  
Waldron, E. M., & Ashby, F. G. (2001). The effects of concurrent task interference on 
category learning: Evidence for multiple category learning systems. Psychonomic 
Bulletin & Review, 8(1), 168-176. 
Watkins, E., & Teasdale, J. D. (2001). Rumination and overgeneral memory in 
depression: Effects of self-focus and analytic thinking. Journal of abnormal 
psychology, 110(2), 353–357.  
Weissman, M. M., & Sholomskas, D. (1977). Assessing depressive symptoms in five 
psychiatric populations: a validation study. American Journal of Epidemiology, 
106(3), 203–214. 
Wells, T. T., & Beevers, C. G. (2010). Biased attention and dysphoria: Manipulating 
selective attention reduces subsequent depressive symptoms. Cognition & Emotion, 
24(4), 719–728. 
Wilson, M.D. (1988) The MRC Psycholinguistic Database: Machine Readable 
 102 
Dictionary, Version 2. Behavioural Research Methods, Instruments and 
Computers, 20(1), 6-11 
World Health Organization. (2012, October 1). Depression Fact Sheet No. 369. Retrieved 
October 11, 2013, from http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs369/en/ 
Worthy, D. A., Gorlick, M. A., Pacheco, J. L., Schnyer, D. M., & Maddox, W. T. (2011). 
With Age Comes Wisdom Decision-making in Younger and Older Adults. 
Psychological Science, 22(11), 1375–1380.  
Worthy, D. A., & Maddox, W. T. (2011). Age-Based Differences in Strategy Use in 
Choice Tasks. Frontiers in neuroscience, 5, 1–10.  
Worthy, D. A., Otto, A. R., & Maddox, W. T. (2012). Working-memory load and 
temporal myopia in dynamic decision-making. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 38(6), 1640–1658.  
Yechiam, E., & Busemeyer, J. R. (2005). Comparison of basic assumptions embedded in 
learning models for experience-based decision-making. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 12(3), 387–402. 
Yechiam, E., & Busemeyer, J. R. (2008). Evaluating generalizability and parameter 
consistency in learning models. Games and Economic Behavior, 63(1), 370-394. 
Zeithamova, D., & Maddox, W.T. (2006). Dual-task interference in perceptual category 
learning. Memory & Cognition, 34(2), 387-398.  
 
